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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Consider the following two situations.  Situation 1: It has been a long day at work.  
You are tired and grumpy and just want to spend the night relaxing, doing something that 
requires very little thought.  You decide this would be a great time to watch that R-rated 
movie that arrived from the DVD-club a couple of weeks ago.  You pop some popcorn, turn 
off the lights, and get comfortable for a night of “mindless” entertainment. 
 Situation 2:  The Academy Awards are scheduled for this coming Sunday, and you 
have been hearing a lot about this new R-rated film.  The actors and director are well known 
for making poignant and thought-provoking films.  You decide you are going to rent this 
movie tonight to see what it is all about and to judge for yourself whether or not it deserves 
the Oscar. 
 Each of these situations involves sitting down to watch the same R-rated film; 
however, in one situation you are intending to watch mindlessly while in the other you are 
expecting to think.  These approaches to viewing a film are not uncommon and are just two 
examples of the many different ways that people may watch a movie.  It would not be 
surprising to find that people walk away from a film with different impressions and perhaps 
even different conclusions about their experience.  One important consideration in the above 
situations is the impact of the violence likely to be in the movie.  Aggression research 
suggests that because the movie has violence in it, you are likely to have an increase in 
aggressive affect and cognitions and, therefore, have now been put at risk for a short-term 
increase in aggressive behavior, regardless of how you watched it (Anderson, 1997; 
Anderson, Berkowitz, Donnerstein, Huesmann, Johnson, Linz, et al, 2003; Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002b; Betsch & Dickenberger, 1993; Bushman, 1995; Bushman & Geen, 1990; 
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Bushman & Huesmann, 2006; Dunand, Berkowtiz, & Leyens, 1984; Johnson, Cohen, 
Smailes, Kasen, & Brook, 2002; Leyens, Cisneros, & Hossay, 1976; Leyens & Dunand, 
1991; Mathews, Kronenberger, Wang, Lurito, Lowe, & Dunn, 2005; Sebastian, Parke, 
Berkowitz, & West, 1978).   
 Previous research on media violence has consistently shown that exposure to violent 
images and ideas can increase the likelihood of aggressive behavior, both in the short-term 
and in the long-term.  Boys are more likely to act aggressively towards one another after 
repeated viewings of violent movies (Sebastian, et al., 1978), and people are more likely to 
inflict a shock or loud noise to another person after violent media exposure (Bartholow, 
Anderson, Carnagey, & Benjamin, 2004; Bushman, 1995; Leyens, et al., 1976; Leyens & 
Dunand, 1991, Lindsay & Anderson, 2000).  These outcomes are explained using a social-
cognitive framework.  In particular, the aggressive concepts in the media are proposed to 
activate aggressive cognitions, which lead to the increased risk for aggressive behavior. 
A number of factors have been considered as potentially increasing or decreasing the 
magnitude of these behaviors, such as: sex, trait aggressiveness, intelligence, charisma of 
perpetrator, justification of aggression, and rewards for aggressive behavior (Anderson, et. 
al., 2003; Berkowitz, 1986).  Despite the thorough investigation of these and other variables, 
little research has considered the differences in “viewing style” as something that could 
influence the magnitude of the media effect.  What the viewer attends to in the movie and 
how deeply they process it are two cognitive viewing-style factors that need more research 
for a better understanding of media violence effects.   
 The first of these factors is attention.  A movie contains, on average, two hours worth 
of auditory and visual stimuli that are organized to create plots, symbolism, storylines, 
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themes, and messages.  This allows for a number of concepts to which the viewer can attend.  
Additionally, in the case of violent movies, there are also a number of non-violent scenes as 
well as storylines, themes, or messages that may be unrelated to aggression altogether.  The 
second factor that ought to be addressed is level of processing.  In the opening paragraphs, 
two different types of viewer-styles are described: one in which the viewer intends to watch a 
violent movie without much mental effort, and one in which the viewer intends to be 
involved and to think.  At present, the manner in which the viewer processes the movie is not 
considered in the media violence literature, and the research may simply suggest that viewing 
style does not matter; everyone would be at risk for an increase in aggressive behavior.    
Differences in attention and level of processing allow for a number of situations 
worth considering in the media violence discussion.  If the viewer is focused on the non-
violent aspects of the movie, do the violent scenes still have the same impact?  Does thinking 
about the movie during viewing change the magnitude of the media effects?  And how do 
these two factors interact?  In particular, how does a deeper processing of non-violent themes 
compare to a general “surface-level” processing of the movie?  As the research on media 
violence effects on aggression uses a social-cognitive model that emphasizes the role of 
cognition leading to aggressive behavior (Anderson & Carnagey, 2004; Anderson & 
Huesmann, 2003; Bandura, 2001; Lindsey & Anderson, 2000) it is important, therefore, to 
begin at the cognitive level to answer these questions. Specifically, research should look at 
how attention and processing factors can change the accessibility of aggressive cognitions.  
Much of the media violence research that uses movies as a stimulus only use isolated clips of 
violent or non-violent scenes, and for that reason, it cannot answer these important full-
movie questions. The cognitive research on semantic priming, however, offers important 
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insights that could be integrated into the media effects research. 
 Semantic priming is the cognitive preparedness of semantically related concepts after 
exposure to an initial stimulus, such that these other concepts are more readily available.  
Research in the cognitive area focuses extensively on how a single word can increase the 
accessibility of other categorically, or semantically, related words (Neely, 1991).  Various 
studies have shown that what a person attends to and the level of processing used can have an 
impact on semantic priming (Dark, Johnston, Myles-Worsley, & Farah, 1985; Friedrich, 
Henik, & Tzelgov, 1991; Henik, Friedrich, & Kellog, 1983; Henik, Friedrick, Tzelgov, & 
Tramer, 1994; Neely, 1991; Remington & Folk, 2001).  One finding is that if two 
categorically-unrelated words are presented at the same time, then the word attended to more 
elicits a stronger semantic priming effect (Woltz & Was, 2006).  It has been theorized that 
this is due to the limited amount of cognitive resources available for these types of 
processing (Anderson, Reder, & Lebiere, 1996; Oberauer, 2002; Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2001; 
Smith, Bentin, & Spalek, 2001).  Focusing one’s attention on one word depletes the amount 
of resources available for priming effects of the other word.  These findings have important 
implications in the more macrocosmic level of watching a movie as there are a potentially 
large number of different concepts upon which to focus. 
 By incorporating the semantic priming research on cognitive resources and multiple 
primes into the media violence research, perhaps some of these questions regarding viewing 
styles can be answered.  If thinking about a movie uses cognitive resources, then there may 
be a limit to the number of concepts primed. The interaction that needs to be considered is 
how thinking deeply or not thinking deeply about either aggressive or non-aggressive 
concepts may have different effects on the subsequent accessibility of aggressive cognitions.  
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Aggression 
The definition of aggression consists of three components.  First, there must be intent 
to harm.  Second, there must be some expectation that the behavior will result in harm.  
Finally, there is an expectation that the other person is motivated to avoid the harm (Gentile 
& Anderson, 2006).  There are many circumstances that can result in a person behaving in 
this way.  Research on aggression is dedicated to understanding what these circumstances are 
and how they elicit such outcomes.  The General Aggression Model (GAM) provides a 
social-cognitive framework for understanding the processes involved that lead to aggressive 
behavior by considering the way external and internal inputs interact to influence our 
emotions and cognitions, and through them our subsequent decisions (Anderson & Carnagey, 
2004; Anderson & Bushman, 2002a; Anderson & Huesmann, 2003; Lindsey & Anderson, 
2000).  The GAM considers the different types of inputs, short-term outcomes, and the routes 
connecting the two in a single cycle of a social interaction (See Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The General Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002a). 
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 A single cycle begins with a combination of personal and situational inputs.  The 
personal inputs are those qualities that the person brings into the situation, such as attitudes, 
beliefs, and behavior tendencies.  Trait aggression, for example, is a personal input; the 
natural tendency for a person to be more prone to aggressive reactions is likely to have an 
impact in the outcome of the interaction (Anderson, 1997; Bushman, 1995; Buss & Perry, 
1992).  The other type of input is situational: those qualities that exist in the environment that 
could either increase or inhibit the likelihood of an aggressive outcome.  A situational input 
could come from either another person or simply the setting.  For example, if another person 
insults the person being examined, this is a situational factor that could increase the 
likelihood of an aggressive reaction (Anderson & Bushman, 2002a).  Similarly, an 
uncomfortable temperature is a factor of the environment that might increase aggression 
(Anderson, 1989). 
 Following the personal and situational inputs in the model are the affective, cognitive, 
and arousal routes to aggression.  These routes operate within the present internal state.  The 
present internal state is how the person is feeling, both emotionally and physically, and 
thinking during this particular cycle.  A personal or situational factor may influence one or 
more of these routes to aggression.  For example, an insult may have an effect on the 
person’s thoughts and feelings.  Similarly, an uncomfortable temperature can change one’s 
physiological arousal.  These routes may also interact with each other in the present internal 
state.  The change in arousal due to temperature may then alter the affect of the person by 
increasing his or her experience of anger, or the anger one feels after being insulted may 
bring forth memories of a previous incident. 
 The present internal state, which has been affected by the inputs, then influences the 
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third part of the cycle: the outcomes.  An important part of the outcomes is the appraisal 
process, of which there are two types (see Figure 2).  The first is immediate appraisal, which 
is dependent on automatic processes and can lead to an impulsive outcome.  If enough 
cognitive resources are available and the outcome is deemed important, however, there may 
be a more controlled reappraisal step that would result in a more thoughtful action. The 
present internal state influences both whether reappraisal is an option and which outcome is 
selected.  If the inputs have made aggressive cognitions more readily available in the present 
internal state, then it is more likely that an aggressive outcome will be chosen. 
 
Figure 2. The General Aggression Model:  
Expanded appraisal and decision processes (Anderson & Bushman, 2002a). 
 
 Numerous studies have been conducted testing the GAM, particularly in the realm of 
media effects.  Research has looked at each part of the model and has tested it on the 
outcomes of behavior, affect, arousal and cognition (Anderson, 1997; Bartholow, et al., 2005; 
Lindsey & Anderson, 2000).  Although it is ultimately interesting to demonstrate that the 
media can influence future behaviors, it is necessary to understand the process by which 
media exposure leads to behavior.  Cognition is an important starting point of this process: 
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Most external influences affect behavior through cognitive processes rather than 
directly.  Cognitive factors partly determine which environmental events will be 
observed, what meaning will be conferred on them, whether they leave any lasting 
effects, what emotional impact and motivating power they will have, and how the 
information they convey will be organized for future use (Bandura, 2001, p. 267). 
Researchers have examined this cognitive level and, using a variety of different 
methodologies, have found support for the theory that violent media increases aggressive 
cognitions.   
 One method that has been used measured aggressive cognitions by having 
participants list their thoughts, after which the experimenters counted the number of 
aggressive thoughts in the list (Bushman & Geen, 1990).  In this study, participants were 
randomly assigned to watch a segment of one of five movies.  The movies varied on how 
aggressive the content was, based on previous coding, ranging from a scene with no physical 
violence to one of excessive and gory violence.  After viewing the clip, participants were 
given three minutes to list the thoughts they had while watching the clip.  Results supported 
the theory by showing that the more aggressive the movie clip was rated, the more aggressive 
thoughts the participants listed.  This study gives potential evidence for the link between 
media violence and aggressive thoughts, but could instead be showing a link between content 
and the participants’ ability to describe the content opposed to an actual priming effect. 
 Another method used to study the increase of aggressive cognitions is by measuring 
the amount of time it takes for a participant to respond to a particular target, such as reading a 
word.  A faster response to aggressive words than to control words serves as a measure for 
accessibility of aggressive cognitions. Anderson (1997) used a reading-reaction-time task to 
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measure this accessibility.  After viewing a violent or non-violent movie scene, participants 
were asked to read aloud each word that was presented individually on a computer screen.  
The 192 trials of the task consisted of 24 aggressive words, 24 anxiety words, 24 escape 
words, and 24 control words, each presented twice in a randomized order.  The dependent 
variable, aggression accessibility, was constructed by subtracting the average reaction time of 
the aggressive words from the average reaction time to the rest of the words.  The results 
showed that, for those with low trait aggression, the participants who watched the violent clip 
had a higher aggressive accessibility score than those who watched the non-violent clip.  This 
method gives further support for the link between media violence and increased aggressive 
cognitions. 
 A third method that has been used to measure concept accessibility is the lexical 
decision task where participants must decide if a group of letters is a word or a non-word 
(Neely, 1991).  A study designed to test the GAM directly used this task to measure 
aggressive cognitions in participants (Lindsey & Anderson, 2000).  Half of the participants 
were asked to rate 18 photographs of weapons, while the other half were asked to rate 18 
photographs of nature scenes.  Following these ratings, participants were then asked to 
identify letter-strings on a computer screen as either words or non-words by pressing either a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ key. Of the 96 trials, 24 were of aggressive words, 24 were escape-related 
words, 23 were control words, and 25 were non-words.  Similar to the procedure with the 
reading-reaction-time task, aggressive accessibility was calculated by subtracting the average 
reaction time for the aggressive words from the non-aggressive words.  Results showed that 
participants in the weapon photographs condition had higher aggressive accessibility scores 
than those who were shown the nature scene photographs.  These three studies are examples 
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of research methods that have been used to demonstrate that exposure to violent media can 
increase the accessibility of aggression cognitions as proposed by the cognitive route in the 
GAM.  
Semantic Priming 
 The phenomenon that violent media content, as a situational input, increases the 
accessibility of aggressive cognitions happens according to a process called semantic 
priming.  Semantic priming can be conceptualized as a form of cognitive-preparedness and is 
founded on the assumption that concepts are organized in memory according to a semantic 
network (Anderson & Huesmann, 2003; Berkowtiz, 1984; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Neely, 
1991).  At each node in the network is a concept, such as ‘bird’ or ‘robin’ or ‘red’; concepts 
are connected in this network with links based on semantic relatedness.  The more related the 
concepts are, the stronger and “closer together” the links are.  As the concept of ‘robin’ is 
very semantically related to the concept of ‘bird,’ these two would lie close together in the 
semantic network and have a strong link between them.  The concept of ‘red’ may be weakly 
linked with ‘robin,’ but not directly connected to ‘bird’ (See Figure 3).  Quillian’s theory of  
 
Figure 3. An example of the semantic network 
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semantic memory holds that all semantic information is organized in this fashion (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975).   
  Spreading activation is the next step towards understanding the priming phenomenon 
(Berkowitz, 1984; Collins & Loftus, 1975, Neely, 1991).  When a single concept is activated, 
such as when a person thinks of a particular idea, the activation spreads outwards along the 
network and partially activates other semantically-related concepts.  These partially activated 
concepts are now more likely to be accessed in a subsequent scan for information.  For 
instance, when a person is shown the word ‘robin,’ the concept ‘robin’ is activated in the 
semantic network.  This activation then spreads out along the network to related nodes and 
the concept ‘bird’ may now be partially activated.  When the person is subsequently shown 
the word ‘bird’ and required to process the word, such as by reading it, the concept ‘bird’ 
will be processed more quickly because it was already partially activated after being primed 
by the word ‘robin.' In this way, groups of concepts can have an increased accessibility 
through exposure of a single, semantically-related concept.   
In social cognition, each section of the network that holds information regarding a 
collection of related concepts or propositions is referred to as a schema. Similarly, a series of 
connected nodes that hold information about behaviors and the order of events are called 
scripts (Anderson & Carnagey, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  For example, the 
interconnected nodes that hold information regarding aggressive concepts would be an 
aggressive schema and those that hold information about aggressive behavior would be an 
aggressive script (See Figure 4).  Altogether, this is how being shown a picture of a gun can 




Figure 4. Simplified associate network of aggression concepts and a retaliation script  
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002a). 
 
likelihood of aggressive behavior.   
 Although semantic priming occurs very rapidly and below conscious awareness, the 
automatic nature of this process is not infinitely powerful.  Spreading activation, for instance, 
decreases in strength the further it travels along the network.  In this way, those concepts that 
are weakly associated or semantically distant from the activated word will not be primed 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975).  In addition to the attributes of spreading activation, attention and 
level of processing are other factors that could potentially restrain the magnitude of semantic 
priming (Dark, et. al., 1985; Friedrich, et al., 1991; Henik, et al., 1983; Henik, et. al., 1994; 
Neely, 1991; Remington & Fold, 2001).   
Attention and Processing 
Attention and level of processing are theorized to impede semantic priming because 
of presumed cognitive resource limits in working memory.  According to theories of 
memory, knowledge is stored in long-term memory and the contents of long-term memory 
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remain below the level of conscious awareness.  When a concept is activated, it is thought to 
be ‘brought’ from long-term memory into working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  
Attending to a prime and processing it on deeper levels requires concepts to be activated in 
working memory.  When one prime is attended to, cognitive resources are allocated to the 
processing of that prime over another.  Similarly, the more processing one engages in of a 
single prime, the more resources are used.  Although there are many theories on exactly how 
resources are allocated in working memory, it is generally accepted that working memory 
does not have an infinite capacity and that there are limits to how much can be processed at a 
time (Anderson, et al., 1996; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Miller, 1956; Oberauer, 2002; Otsuka 
& Kawaguchi, 2007; Smith, et al., 2001). 
 The strongest evidence for how the allocation of cognitive resources for attention and 
processing can have an impact on semantic priming is found in research on priming effects of 
single words.  The participant is exposed to a priming word stimulus and then asked to 
respond in some way to a target word.  There is evidence that when participants focus on the 
specific qualities of words, instead of the word itself, there is no semantic priming.  This has 
been demonstrated by variety of methods including asking participants to search for a 
specific letter within the word, to identify initial letters as consonants or vowels, and with 
Stroop tasks (Friedrich, et al., 1991; Henik, et al., 1983; Henik, et. al., 1994).  To understand 
these effects, a variety of theories have been developed that propose how resources are 
allocated.  One particular theory incorporates the idea of attention modulation.  Specifically, 
this theory proposes that there is a limited capacity of resources and semantic activation can 
be modulated depending on the allocation of cognitive resources towards processing attended 
to stimuli (Smith, et al., 2001). 
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 Otsuka and Kawaguchi (2007) tested this using an auditory task to consume cognitive 
resources during a standard priming task.  Participants were shown an initial “+” symbol and 
were simultaneously presented with a tone.  Following a 500 ms black and silent screen, 
participants were then shown a prime stimulus word while also being presented with a 
second tone.  The participants had been told that they would be asked to indicate whether the 
two tones were identical.  Following this was 50 ms of black and a silent period, and then 
participants where shown a target stimulus for which they had been instructed to indicate 
whether it was a word or a non-word.  After making their selection, a 1,000 ms blank and 
silent period was followed by a “?” which indicated to the participant to choose whether the 
two tones were the same.  The participants were not expected to make any connection 
between the two words presented, only the two tones.   
 This task required the use of cognitive resources as participants had to hold 
information in short-term memory about the two tones while completing the lexical decision 
portion.  By allocating resources to attend to the tones, it was hypothesized that there would 
not be sufficient resources for semantic priming of the target word by the initial word.  Three 
conditions were used for the auditory task: a full attention condition where no tones were 
presented, a low-divided attention condition where the tones were clearly different, and a 
high-divided attention where the tones were close in frequency, making it a difficult 
judgment.  A series of three experiments were conducted using this paradigm to test the 
attention modulation hypothesis while ruling out other possible explanations.  It was 
consistently found in all three experiments that for the high-divided attention conditions there 
was no semantic priming effect, whereas the full attention condition had a normal semantic 
priming effect, and the low-divided condition had a reduced semantic priming effect.   
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 A repetition priming effect – where the same word is repeated as both prime and 
target – was found in the high-divided attention condition.  Repetition priming happens when 
a person responds quicker to a word the second time he or she sees it.  The first time the 
person processes the word, the concept is activated; upon the second presentation, the 
concept is still activated and the reaction time decreases.  Repetition priming does not require 
spreading activation.  Because the repetition-priming still occurred in the high-divided 
condition, this study provides evidence that the spreading activation necessary for semantic 
priming requires cognitive resources that were otherwise being allocated to the auditory task. 
 In addition to splitting attention between word features or other sensory tasks, the role 
of cognitive resources in priming has also been evaluated with identical types of processing.  
Looking at features of a word directs attention away from the whole word itself, and listening 
to tones involves different sensory processes.  Woltz and Was (2006), however, investigated 
what would happen when participants were presented with two types of whole-word primes.  
Along with establishing that both words could produce the priming effect, a deeper 
processing of one of the words resulted in a greater magnitude of priming semantically 
related words.  Participants were shown four words from two different categories (e.g. 
“ruby”, “daughter”, “diamond”, “uncle”).  They were then given instructions to remember 
one of the categories and asked to recall the two words.  Following this, they were given a 
same-different category task, which involved showing the participant two words 
simultaneously and asking them to indicate whether the words were from the same or 
different categories (e.g. “leaf/spoon”, “century/month”).  One-third of the word-pairs were 
from the category participants were asked to remember, one-third were from the other 
initially primed category, and the remaining third involved unprimed categories.   
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Results showed that participants responded most quickly to matching pairs of words 
in the category they were told to focus on.  The ignored category was still primed, but the 
magnitude was not as high as for the focused category.  This study provides evidence that 
multiple primes, of which the participant is aware, can have differential semantic activation 
effects depending on where attention is directed.    
Attention and Processing in Media Effects 
 Because attention to stimuli and depth of processing have an impact on the magnitude 
of semantic priming, they are potentially important factors that need to be incorporated in the 
cognitive routes to aggression as additional personal and/or situational factors.  Attention and 
depth of processing are of particular importance when discussing a stimulus like a movie.  
The multitude of images, motifs, themes, and messages offer a large array of items to attend 
to along with different levels of processing for each concept.  Although these factors have not 
been studied in depth in the media violence research, a few studies have begun to investigate 
attention and processing. 
 Bushman and Geen (1990) included an attention measure in their study of the effects 
of violent movie clips on aggressive cognitions, affect, and arousal.  In addition to irritability 
and hostility, a measure of stimulus screening was included in the study.  It was theorized 
that stimulus screening is a form of selective attention.  Some people may try to defend 
themselves against arousing stimulation in the media by selectively attending to other 
stimuli, those that would not result in such high stimulation.  This selective attention could 
result in preventing the activation of semantic networks related to the blocked stimuli.  Using 
the thought listing task as a measurement of aggressive cognitions, it was found that those 
participants who scored as high stimulus screeners listed fewer aggressive thoughts after 
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observing a violent movie clip than low stimulus screeners.  It appears that a natural 
disposition for selecting what stimuli are attended to could moderate the violent media effect.  
Although this was not a very rigorous test of attention moderating semantic priming, and 
could benefit from the use of a reaction-time dependent variable, it is a beginning step in 
suggesting that viewers’ differential attention to a movie could have different outcomes 
related to aggressive cognitions. 
 The notion of how the prime is processed has also been briefly examined in media 
effects research. Similar to the word versus letter level of analysis tasks described earlier, 
Leyens, Cisernos, and Hossay (1976) manipulated the level of analysis in slides of weapons 
and demonstrated different behavioral outcomes.  Although cognitions were not measured, 
the General Aggression Model holds that there would likely be a cognitive route from picture 
viewing to aggressive behavior.  Participants were shown slides of either aggressive or 
neutral content, such as weapons or nature scenes, and then were given a measure of 
aggressive behavior that consisted of ostensibly administering electric shocks to another 
person.  Some of the participants exposed to the aggressive slides were told beforehand that 
they were to evaluate the slides for the aesthetic qualities of framing and focus.  Like the 
letter-level task, this required participants to attend to more specific parts of the picture rather 
than looking at it as a whole.  The results of the study showed that those subjects who were 
told to look at the aesthetic qualities of the aggressive slides behaved less aggressively than 
those who saw the aggressive slides and were given no instructions.  It should also be noted 
that those participants who looked for aesthetic qualities of the aggressive slides did not 
differ significantly in aggressive behavior from those who looked at the neutral slides with no 
instructions. Although this study cannot offer conclusions regarding differences in semantic 
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priming, it supports differential outcomes based on levels of processing.   
 Another important consideration of processing, besides the level, is that of meaning.  
Concepts must be processed on a meaningful level for semantic priming to take place, as 
supported by the letter-level of analysis studies.  One study of media effects on aggression 
considered how different types of meaning can result in different outcomes (Bartholow et al., 
2004).  To investigate the importance of meaning, the well-established weapons effect was 
tested for different samples in three experiments.  The phenomenon that the mere presence of 
a weapon, or an image of a weapon, can increase aggressive behavior is known as the 
weapons effect (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967).  Bartholow et al. (2004) hypothesized that 
hunters and non-hunters would have different schemas regarding hunting weapons, and these 
differences in meaning would result in different aggressive outcomes.  To test this, hunters 
and non-hunters were recruited for participation.  The first experiment established that 
hunters had more knowledge about guns than did non-hunters, suggesting the possibility that 
different nodes, or sets of nodes, were connected to the concept of a hunting gun in the 
semantic network.   
 The second and third experiments evaluated aggressive-concept accessibility and 
aggressive behavior, respectively, after being primed with images of either hunting or assault 
weapons.  The aggressive-concept activation was measured using the reading-reaction-time 
task described earlier and found that hunters responded less quickly than non-hunters to 
aggression-related words after viewing images of hunting weapons. This suggests that the 
hunting weapon concepts may have been linked to other non-aggressive concepts in the 
hunters’ semantic networks, whereas non-hunters had the more traditionally assumed links 
with aggression concepts.  The behavioral measure of giving noise blasts to an ostensible 
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partner also showed these differences.  Hunters gave more noise blasts after being primed 
with assault rifles than with hunting rifles, whereas non-hunters gave about the same number 
of noise blasts regardless of weapon type.  These two findings support the link between 
differential accessibility of aggressive cognitions and subsequent aggressive behavior.  
Furthermore, this study corroborates the idea that different semantic meaning associated with 
the stimulus can influence the priming effect.  Along with the Leyens et al. (1976) study and 
the letter-level research demonstrating that it is possible to not process the semantic meaning 
of a stimulus, the Bartholow et al. study elucidates that similar processing, but different 
meanings, can influence the accessibility of aggressive cognitions.  Altogether, attention and 
processing have been briefly investigated in aggression research, but more work is needed to 
determine the impact these factors have on media violence effects. 
Viewing Styles 
 In addition to just considering attention and processing, it must be acknowledged that 
people differ in what they attend to and how they process the information.  Unlike in the 
word tasks, these differences do not solely come from features within the movie or the 
instructions given by an experimenter.  According to the uses and gratifications theory, 
people have a variety of needs that influence their viewing behaviors, including needs for 
relatedness, identification, information and escaping from reality (Blumler, 1979; Blulmer & 
Katz, 1974; Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973).  How a person chooses to fulfill these may 
influence both the selection of movie content, as well as the level of processing applied.  
Besides picking which movies to watch, viewers might also choose which type of scenes 
they will attend to during the movie.  Some may be more intrigued by violence and thus pay 
closer attention to these scenes, whereas others may be more interested in the relationship-
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oriented storyline.  Additionally, some people may choose to process the images and 
dialogues on a relatively surface level in order to simply follow the plot, thus requiring the 
use of fewer cognitive resources (Lang, 2000).  Others may choose to process these on a 
deeper level to get at the underlying messages, by looking for symbolism or thinking about 
themes, for instance, and would thus use more cognitive resources in the process (Lang, 
2000).  Others may not consciously think about all the ideas presented but will become 
emotionally involved, by allowing themselves to empathize with the characters to discern 
meaning and thus activate schemas (Lang, 2000; Miall, 1989).  
   Furthermore, attention and processing are closely related because one must pay 
attention to something in order to process it on a deeper level.  In the movie setting, however, 
it is possible to attend to one type of scene for plot-related information, but not process it on 
a meaningful level.  This makes it important to consider attention and level of processing 
separately, unlike in the letter-level type tasks where attention and deeper processing are 
more directly correlated.  With the evidence that attention and type of processing can have an 
impact on the magnitude of semantic priming effects, and the contention that semantic 
priming can serve as a cognitive route to aggressive behavior, the roles attention and type of 
processing have in media violence effects need further investigation. 
The Current Study 
 The current study was designed to test the hypothesis that the media violence effect 
could change based on different viewing styles.  Because different movie-viewing styles 
have yet to be established, a basic approach was taken by classifying participants as either 
surface-viewers or depth-viewers.  These correspond to different levels of processing: 
surface-viewers engage in minimal processing and depth-viewers actively seek deeper 
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messages in the movie.  A manipulation was used in the study to classify the participant as 
either a surface or depth viewer.  Additional personality measures were included, however, to 
explore the idea that because people have different needs that influence their media use, they 
may have a natural inclination in how they watch a film, regardless of the instructions given.   
 It is worth noting that this discussion has described viewing styles as varying by 
depth, predominately defined as thinking or not thinking.  Given that most literary works, 
including movies, are designed to elicit emotional responses in viewers, it may be that depth 
of feeling could also be a dimension of viewing style (Miall, 1989).  In particular, depth of 
feeling and depth of thinking may go hand-in-hand in processing movie messages.  Thoughts 
and feelings, therefore, must be considered as potential characteristics of depth.  It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to come to a definitive definition of different viewing styles, but both 
thinking and feeling were considered as potential routes to deeper processing. 
 Attention was also considered in the current study, but was not manipulated or 
controlled.  The stimulus chosen for the study was a full-length, R-rated film that contained a 
number of violent and non-violent scenes.  Following the movie, participants described the 
two scenes they found most striking.  These data were used to determine to what type of 
scenes participants attended.  By combining the surface/depth classification with the type of 
scenes described, the study was able to investigate the level of processing and attention 
effects on the priming of aggressive cognitions after viewing a violent movie.  Based on 
previous research in media effects and semantic priming, five hypotheses were posited about 
accessibility of aggression and movie-related concepts after watching a full-length violent 
movie: 
Hypothesis I: Participants in the experimental conditions (those who completed the 
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dependent measure after watching the movie) would be primed for aggression and for 
movie concepts, as compared to the control condition (who completed the dependent 
measure before watching the movie. 
Hypothesis II:  Those participants who attended to non-aggressive scenes would be less 
primed for aggression than those who attended to aggressive scenes. 
Hypothesis III: Participants who attended to non-aggressive scenes would be more primed 
for movie-related words than for aggression-related words.  The opposite was 
expected for those who attended to aggressive scenes.  
Hypothesis IV: There would be an interaction between attention and level of processing, 
with deep processing of non-aggressive scenes being the least primed for aggression. 
Hypothesis V: There would be an interaction between attention and level of processing 
when comparing within group movie-related and aggression-related priming.  The 
finding expected in hypothesis III would be stronger for those with deep processing, 
thus polarizing the effect. 
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CHAPTER 3.  METHODS 
Design 
 The study was developed according to a 2 (Level of Processing: depth, surface) by 3 
(Attention: aggressive, mix, non-aggressive) design with the incorporation of a control 
condition.  Each session consisted of a group of up to four people, and each session was 
randomized into one of three conditions (two of which the level of processing was 
manipulated).  Two of the conditions, depth and surface, included instructions on how to 
watch the movie, either by encouraging or discouraging thinking; participants completed a 
lexical decision task (LDT) immediately following the movie.  Participants in the third 
(control) condition completed the LDT before watching the movie and were given no 
instructions on how to watch the movie.  To measure attention, participants were asked 
questions about their experience watching the movie.  These data were coded to determine 
the type of scene to which the participants paid attention.  Table 1 lays out the nine-cell 
design along with the number of participants in each cell. 
Table 1.  Layout of nine-cell design and corresponding number of participants. 
 
 Post-Hoc Attention Measure  
Condition 
Aggressive 
Scene Mix Scene 
Orthogonal 
Scene Total N 
Surface (A)     
  Watched movie before LDT 25 9 38 72 
  Told to relax     
 
Depth (B)     
  Watched movie before LDT 24 20 22 66 
  Told to pay attention     
 
Control (C)     
  Completed LDT before movie 27 9 24 60 
  No instructions given     
     




 A total of 208 students from a large Midwestern university participated in this study 
for partial credit for their introductory psychology classes. The data for six participants were 
thrown out of the analysis because of the following problems that arose during the study.  
Two participants did not watch the entire movie.  One participant was unable to complete the 
lexical decision task in the time allotted.  Another participant completed the lexical decision 
task at the wrong time in the procedure.  After a preliminary pass of the lexical decision data, 
one participant did not appear to comply with the rules of the task, as he answered “word” for 
all practice and actual trials, including all the non-words.  Finally, one participant’s lexical 
decision data was accidentally overwritten.  Four additional participants were further dropped 
from the study after the lexical decision task data was cleaned.  This procedure and the 
reason for dropping the participants are discussed in the results section. 
  Of the remaining 198 participants, 95 were male (48%) and 176 (88.9%) self-
identified as Caucasian/European American.  The average age of the participants was 19 
years; their ages ranged from 18 to 28.  After three weeks of collecting data, an amendment 
was made to the study to recruit only students fluent in the English language because the 
dependent variable required reading English words.  Eleven students (5.6%) indicated they 
were not native English speakers.  Students were recruited using the online sign-up system, 
SONA, and were asked to participate only if they were at least 18 years of age and had 
previously participated in one of the mass testing sessions held by the psychology 
department.  Of these 198 participants, 179 (90.4%) completed the measures that were 
presented in the mass testing sessions.  The remaining 10% were only excluded from 




 An audience experience questionnaire and the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
(Buss & Perry, 1992) were presented during mass testing sessions held by the psychology 
department because the content of these scales was overtly related to the hypotheses of the 
study.  Presenting these questionnaires outside the context of the current study was expected 
to reduce the likelihood of demand characteristics.  The rest of the measures were presented 
during the 150-minute study session. 
Levels of Processing 
 Audience Experience Questionnaire (AEQ).  The AEQ was designed specifically for 
this study to determine whether a person naturally tends to watch movies on a deep level or 
not.  A series of statements were assembled describing different ways people watch movies 
or use movies in their lives.  Each statement was followed by a five point Likert-type scale, 
asking participants to select from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”  A pilot study was 
conducted and a series of factor analyses were performed to determine which questions were 
most appropriate to measure depth of viewing.  A total of 505 participants were administered 
the first draft of the AEQ as part of a series of online questionnaires. 
 Statements were selected according to their effect on the reliability of the scale and 
how items correlated according to the factor analysis.  Based upon the groupings of the 
items, the factors retained for the scale were those that reflected emotional or cognitive 
involvement in a movie.  Unfortunately, from the items tested, there was no factor reflecting 
a surface-only construct.  It was decided that the scale would be used as a measure of depth-




 A total of four factors emerged in the final assembly of the scale: thinking, escaping, 
absorption, and feeling.  The items corresponding to each of these factors and their respective 
alpha coefficients can be seen in Table 2.  The final AEQ has a total of 20 items with an 
internal reliability of .86.  To calculate a total AEQ score and obtain a “depth” score, the 
escaping, absorption, and feeling items were averaged together to create an emotive score, 
due to the amount of overlap these items had in the factor analysis.  This score represents the 
degree to which deeper experience occurs through emotional routes.  For the total AEQ 
score, the emotive score and the thinking score are averaged together.  This allows for 
thinking, the depth experience through cognitive routes, to be weighted equally with the 
feeling, absorption, and escaping subscales.  In the current study, the full AEQ had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .85; the reliability coefficients for the individual subscales are listed in 
Table 2.  The correlations between all the potential processing measures are presented in 
Table 3. 
 Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  Because the AEQ is a newly 
developed scale, the Need for Cognition scale (NFC) was used as an additional measure of 
depth through cognition.  The NFC measures “tendency for an individual to engage in and 
enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116) and is made up of 34 statements.  Each 
statement is rated on a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from -4, “very strong disagreement” 
to +4 “very strong agreement.” Items on the NFC include “I really enjoy a task that involves 
coming up with new solutions to problems,” “The notion of thinking abstractly is not 
appealing to me,” and “I appreciate opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses of 





Table 2. The Audience Experience Questionnaire 
 Subscale Reliability Items 
Thinking α = .706a I like movies that make me think. 
 α = .728b I like when I have to figure out what’s going on in a movie. 
  After seeing a movie, I like to talk about and analyze it. 
  
When I watch a movie again, I like to look for things I missed the 
first time. 
  I like to interpret the symbolism in a movie. 
  
I do not give any thought to a movie after it has ended  
(Reverse Score). 
Escaping α = .740a Movies work well to distract me from my life. 
 α = .729b Sometimes when I watch a movie it feels like everything else in 
the world just goes away. 
  I often lose track of time when I watch a movie. 
  I will watch a movie to distract me from my problems. 
Absorption α = .812a Often a movie can feel real to me. 
 α = .796b When I watch a movie, I like being in the moment and 
experiencing everything with the characters. 
  I have been known to lose myself in a movie. 
  There can be something magic about a movie. 
  
If the main character is feeling a particular emotion (happy, sad, 
angry) I will start to feel that way too. 
  I often put myself in the character’s shoes. 
Feeling α = .754a I want to watch a movie that makes me feel something. 
 α = .721b I prefer to feel something about a movie rather than just think 
about it. 
  I enjoy being touched by a movie. 
  A good movie (to me) is one that moves me. 
a






Table 3. Descriptive statistics for and bivariate correlations between potential processing measures. 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. AEQ: Total 7.36 1.07   --           
2. AEQ: Emotive 3.48  .63 .807**   --          
3. AEQ: Think 3.88  .67 .830** .341**   --         
4. AEQ: Feel 3.77  .69 .625** .745** .292**   --        
5. AEQ: Escape 3.28  .85 .636** .833** .226** .353**    --       
6. AEQ: Absorb 3.38  .76 .739** .891** .334** .557**  .645**    --      
7. NFC 5.83  .87 .179** .019  .268** .118 -.004 -.056    --     
8. QMEE 5.96  .76 .227** .374** .008 .421**  .191*  .338**  .054   --    
9. KTS: Extrovert/Introvert 1.65  .89 .100 .107 .059 .095  .059  .114 -.056 
 .149*   --   
10. KTS: Sensing/Intuition 1.99  .94 .167* .154* .121 .167*  .139  .076  .192**  .304** -.045   --  
11. KTS: Thinker/Feeler 2.42  .87 .131 .204** .016 .204**  .133  .177* -.127  .394** -.097 .307**   -- 
12. KTS: Judger/Perceiver 1.58  .87 .131 .081 .133 .069  .080  .049  .078 -.007 -.041 .424** .243** 
Note. AEQ = Audience Experience Questionnaire; NFC = Need for Cognition; QMEE = Questionnaire Measure of Emotional 
Empathy; KTS = Kiersey Temperament Sorter 





Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).  
The Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE) was used as an additional 
measure of emotional depth.   Thirty-one items were used to measure an individual’s 
awareness and responsiveness to another’s emotions.  Each statement was rated on a 9-point 
Likert-type scale, ranging from -4, “very strong disagreement” to +4 “very strong 
agreement.”  Items on the QMEE include “I become very involved when I watch a movie,” 
“I am very upset when I see an animal in pain,” and “I am able to make decisions without 
being influenced by people's feelings.”  In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha for the QMEE 
was .83.  
 Keirsey Temperament Sorter (KTS; Keirsey & Bates, 1984). The Keirsey 
Temperament Sorter (KTS) is a personality assessment based on the psychological types 
proposed by C.G. Jung (1923).  It assigns people to one of 16 types, similar to the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator.  Scores lie along four dichotomies – extroversion/introversion, 
sensing/intuition, thinking/feeling, and judging/perceiving – that give each person four letters 
(e.g. ‘ESFP,’ ‘INTJ’) matching one of the 16 types.  The letter ‘X’ can be assigned whenever 
a person lies directly between the two extremes.  For instance, if a person selected an equal 
number of ‘extrovert’ and ‘introvert’ responses, they would receive an ‘X’ instead of an ‘E’ 
or ‘I.’  The ‘X’ would then be incorporated into their label (e.g. ‘IXTJ,’ ‘ENFX’).  The KTS 
is made up of 70 items that ask the participant to select between two possible responses.  
Items on the KTS include: “At parties do you (a) stay late, with increasing energy, (b) leave 
early, with decreased energy,” “Are you more attracted to (a) sensible people, (b) imaginative 
people,” “Are you more interested in (a) what is actual, (b) what is possible,” and “Does it 
bother you more having things (a) incomplete, (b) completed.”  In this study, Cronbach’s 
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alpha for the KTS was .98.   
Accessibility of Cognitions 
 The accessibility of aggressive cognitions was measured using a lexical decision task 
(LDT; Neely, 1991).  Target word stimuli were presented to participants, and their reaction 
times were measured using the DirectRT computer program module for MediaLab.  All letter 
strings were presented in white font on a black background in the middle of the computer 
screen.  Each trial began with a 500 ms presentation of ‘XXX’ in the center of the screen, 
followed by 250 ms of black, and then the target string, which remained on the screen until 
participants made a selection.  The “z” button on the keyboard was labeled “non-word” and 
the “/” button was labeled “word.”  Participants were instructed to indicate the letter string as 
either a word or non-word by pressing the button as fast, but as accurately, as possible.  A 
practice session of detailed instructions and six trials were presented to the participants 
before completing the actual task.  The practice session had three control words and three 
non-words that were not used in the later task. 
 The full LDT consisted of 98 trials.  The first two trials were always either a control 
word or a non-word, and these were treated as additional practice.  The following 96 trials 
consisted of 24 aggression related words, 24 movie related words, 24 control words, and 24 
non-words.  These words were arranged into 12 randomly presented blocks.  Each block 
contained two of each word type and these eight words were randomized as well.  Words 
were chosen for this task using the word and non-word generators on the English Lexicon 
Project website (Balota, Cortese, Hutchison, Neely, Nelson, Simpson, & Treiman, 2002).   
 The following specifications were used to create a word list: six or seven letters, an 
average reaction time between 560 and 670 ms, and a log transformed frequency score 
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between six and ten.  Once this list was complied, 24 words were chosen that were 
aggression-related and 24 that were unrelated to aggression or the movie.  Similarly, the 24 
movie-related words were chosen from the list meeting the following criteria: three six-letter 
and three seven-letter relationship-related, journey-related, scene-specific words, and Amish 
culture-related words.  The non-words were selected from a non-word generated list using  
the 6-7 letter and 560 – 570 ms reaction time criteria.  The full word list can be found in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Lexical Decision Task word list 
 Type Word Type Word Type Word 
Aggressive  Movie  Control  
 brutal Relational beloved  applies 
 dagger  caring  chants 
 grabbed  grandpa  charms 
 gunfire  parent  chilled 
 gunshot  passion  choices 
 harmed  trusts  fashion 
 harmful Journey adjust  gossip 
 injured  belong  lately 
 insult  courage  margin 
 kicked  healing  monkey 
 killers  helping  motels 
 lethal  hiding  orange 
 murders Scene dancing  pancake 
 pistol  garage  paused 
 punched  raising  planner 
 pushed  swings  resorts 
 shoved  thirst  rhythm 
 smacked  tourist  skilled 
 stabbed Amish customs  slender 
 threat  farmer  tailor 
 victim  horses  tipping 
 violent  passive  wealthy 
 weapon  praying  widely 




 Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ;Buss & Perry, 1992).  Aggression 
research has previously shown a link between trait aggression and violent media effects 
(Anderson, 1997; Bushman, 1995).  It was important to include a trait aggression measure to 
be able to ensure that surface/depth effects could not otherwise be explained as a trait 
aggression effect.  The Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ) is made of up 29 
statements.  Participants were instructed to answer each item on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
which ranged from “extremely uncharacteristic of me” to “extremely characteristic of me.”  
Example items are “I can’t help getting into arguments when people disagree with me,” “At 
times I feel I have a gotten a raw deal out of life,” and “If somebody hits me, I hit back.”  An 
alpha coefficient for the Aggression Questionnaire has been reported at .89 and was .90 for 
the current study. 
 Striking Scenes Questions.  Questions were asked at the end of the study about the 
participants’ experience with the film.  Following the procedure used in literary studies on 
absorption during reading, participants were asked to identify the two most striking scenes 
from the movie and to describe what made the scene striking (Kuiken, Phillips, Gregus, 
Miall, Verbitsky, & Tonkonogy, 2004).  A striking scene was defined to participants as “your 
favorite scene or one that was just particularly memorable.”  Participants were also directed 
to include in their description any thoughts or feelings they may have had while watching the 
scene. 
 Demographics and Cohort Questions. In addition to the personality questionnaires 
and striking scenes questions, participants were also asked a series of demographic and 
cohort questions.  Participants were asked to indicate their age, sex, ethnicity, major, year 
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classification (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and whether or not they were a native 
English speaker.  There was also a series of questions administered after the movie that asked 
how many people were in the group and to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale whether 
there was any talking during the movie, if they found the talking to be distracting, and if the 
talking changed their experience with the movie.  There was also a final question asking if 
any of the other people in the group were the participant’s friend. 
Stimulus 
 The movie used in the current study was Witness (Feldman, Bombyk, & Weir, 1985), 
starring Harrison Ford and Kelly McGillis.  It is 112 minutes long and is rated R.  This movie 
was selected for the numerous violent and non-violent scenes it contains, as well as themes 
that contrasted with the violent storyline, such as community and romance. This movie was 
also chosen because it is relatively old and unknown, particularly among the population 
sampled.  This increased the likelihood that participants had not previously seen the movie 
and would not introduce a confounding variable of past experience or knowledge related to 
the movie. 
Procedure 
 The study was conducted with participants in groups of one to four people.  Before 
the experiment began, the groups were randomly assigned by a die roll to one of three 
conditions: surface, depth, or control.  Signs were displayed above the television set to 
remind participants of their instructions.  All conditions required posting ‘Please refrain from 
talking’ and ‘Please no texting’ signs.  In the surface condition, two additional signs were 
posted: ‘Relax,’ ‘Just veg-out.’  In the depth condition, the signs ‘Pay attention’ and ‘What 
messages are there?’ were posted.  Upon arriving in the laboratory, participants were directed 
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to individual cubicles where they were given informed consent documents to read and sign.  
After agreeing to participate, the experimenter went over the major details of the study again 
in case the participant had any initial questions. 
 The first task that all participants completed was the practice lexical decision task.  
Experimenters explained the basics of the task, asked if there were any questions, and then 
directed participants to the computer where more detailed instructions were given.  
Following the practice task, all participants were presented with the demographic questions.  
Participants then completed the three personality questionnaires (NFC, QMEE, and KTS), 
which were presented in random order on the computer.  After these, a screen on the 
computer instructed the participant to open the cubicle door and wait for the experimenter. 
 At this point in the study, those participants in the control condition were reminded 
the goals of the word task and completed the full LDT.  Following this, control participants 
moved into a larger room with the others to watch the movie.  Participants in the surface and 
depth conditions moved into the larger room after completing the personality questionnaires.  
The following instructions were read to the participants: 
[Surface Condition]: You are now going to watch the movie Witness starring Harrison 
Ford.  Please make yourselves comfortable as the movie is approximately two hours 
long.  One way people watch movies is for entertainment and as a way to relax or 
unwind.  For some people, watching a movie is a great way to veg-out and turn your 
brain off.  Have you watched a movie for this purpose, to just relax and not have to 
think? Okay.  We would like to try to re-create this experience as you watch the 
movie.  So I’ll ask that you please relax and imagine you’ve just picked up this movie 
at the end of a long day for some light entertainment and a chance to decompress.  I’ll 
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also ask that you try to refrain from talking so each person can fully enjoy the movie.  
When the final credits begin, please open the door. 
[Depth Condition]: You are now going to watch the movie Witness starring Harrison 
Ford.  Please make yourselves comfortable as the movie is approximately two hours 
long. One way people watch movies is to get very involved in the film and try to pick 
up on everything that is going on.  Remember in English class the teacher asking you 
to pay attention to the details, themes, and messages of the story?  People may watch 
movies for this purpose as well.  Have you ever watched a movie this way? Okay. We 
would like to re-create this experience as you watch the movie.  Allow yourself to 
become engaged with the characters.  There is generally more to a movie than the 
basic plot, so while you are watching, pay attention to all the different messages and 
ideas that are in the movie.  I’ll also ask that you try to refrain from talking so each 
person can fully enjoy the movie.  When the final credits begin, please open the door. 
[Control Condition]: You are now going to watch the movie Witness starring 
Harrison Ford.  Please make yourselves comfortable as the movie is approximately 
two hours long.  Please try to refrain from talking so each person can fully enjoy the 
movie.  When the final credits begin, please open the door. 
After the movie, all participants were directed to return to their original cubicles.  
Participants in the surface and depth conditions were now reminded of the goals of the word 
task and completed the full LDT.  Following this, or directly following the movie for the 
control condition, participants were told that their next task was to select two striking scenes 
from the movie and to describe why they picked them.  This task was also completed on the 
computer; then, the cohort questions were presented.  Once the computer tasks were finished, 
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the experimenter asked the participants if they had ever seen the movie before, if they had 
any trouble with any of the instructions during the experiment, including directions on how 
to watch the movie if they were in the surface or depth condition, and if they had a guess as 
to the hypothesis being tested in the study.  Finally, the experimenter debriefed the 
participants, explaining that the purpose of the experiment was to see if the different ways in 
which people watch movies changes the way the violent content affects them.  Participants 
were then given their credit receipt and thanked for their time. 
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CHAPTER 4.  RESULTS 
Attention Measure: Type-of-Scene Coding 
 To determine the type of scene participants attended to, the striking scene questions 
completed after the movie were coded.  Participant responses were randomized and given a 
new subject number to blind the raters to condition.  For each of the first two scenes 
mentioned by the participant, a rating of either ‘Orthogonal,’ ‘Mix,’ or ‘Aggressive’ was 
assigned. The term ‘orthogonal’ was used as part of the coding scheme to emphasize that 
these ideas were unrelated to aggression in any form, whereas ‘non-aggressive’ could imply 
the inclusion of scenes where characters ceased harming others or protected others from 
harm. 
 An orthogonal rating was assigned to responses that mentioned a scene containing no 
acts of aggression during the entire scene and where the respondent did not discuss anything 
related to aggression – in either the form of intentionally hurting someone or preventing 
someone from being hurt.  An aggressive rating was assigned to responses that mentioned a 
scene that contained any act of aggression (physical or verbal) and when the respondent’s 
discussion focused on aggressive themes; again, this included discussing the prevention of 
harm because the concept of harm is still incorporated.  Finally, a mix rating was assigned to 
responses that either mentioned an orthogonal scene but discussed aggressive ideas or 
mentioned a part of a scene that included acts of aggression but discussed orthogonal ideas.  
For any participants who mentioned more than two scenes, only the first two scenes were 
considered. 
 Two coders independently rated 160 of the responses.  After coding approximately 30 
participants, the raters compared their results.  When disagreements in the ratings were 
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encountered, the two raters discussed their reasons for their decision and came to a consensus 
for the final rating.  Comparisons were made after each set of 30 participants in order to 
decrease the possibility of rater drift, as the discussions of disagreements helped formalize 
the coding criteria.  A kappa coefficient was calculated to determine the reliability of the two 
raters, Κ=.81, p<.001.  For the following analyses, only the first scene described by the 
participants was used.  There was no relation between the type of scene chosen first and 
second, χ2(4)=3.129, p=.536; therefore, it was decided to only use the first scene as an 
indicator of type-of-scene attended to because it was the scene the participants found the 
most striking. 
Dependent Variables: Lexical Decision Data 
 Prior to testing the hypotheses, the lexical decision data were cleaned and analyzed 
for potential outliers.  A variety of different methods have been used to identify which trials 
should be deleted from the analysis, and which trails should be truncated, including using 
Tukey’s hinges or two standard deviations from the mean (Lindsey & Anderson, 2000; 
Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2007).  The following procedure was used for this analysis.  For any 
aggression, movie, or control word the participant did not accurately identify as a word, that 
trial was deleted.  A modified box plot was calculated of each individual’s reaction time for 
aggression, movie, and control words.  Any individual reaction time that was identified as an 
extreme outlier was deleted.  Three participants were excluded from further analyses for 
having more than ten total trials deleted from their data.  Those reaction times that were 
labeled as moderate outliers were truncated.  Slow reaction times were replaced with the 
value of the third quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range.  Fast reaction times were 
replaced with the value of the first quartile minus 1.5 times the interquartile range.  After 
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each individual’s data were cleaned, modified box plots were calculated for each condition 
by means for word type to determine if there were additional outliers.  One additional 
participant was further excluded from analysis because his average reaction time for each 
type of word was twice that of the group mean, and ranged from 250 ms to 650 ms slower 
than the next slowest participant.  
 The reaction time data from the LDT was used as a measure of semantic priming.  
For the following analysis, three index scores were calculated from the reaction time data to 
serve as the dependent variables instead of using mean scores.  This was done to control for 
individual variances in average reaction time.  An aggression score was calculated by 
subtracting an individual’s mean reaction time for the aggression words from their mean 
reaction time for the control words.  A movie score was calculated similarly, by subtracting 
mean movie-related times from mean control times.  Positive scores on these indices 
reflected that participants were primed because they responded faster to the aggression and/or 
movie-related words than the control words.  Finally, a difference score was created in order 
to test if participants were more primed for movie-related or for aggression words.  The 
movie score was subtracted from the aggression score to determine the difference score.  A 
positive score reflected a participant being more primed for aggression than the movie, and a 
negative score reflected a participant being more primed for the movie than aggression. 
Primary Results 
Baseline Effects 
 Because sex and trait aggression, as measured by the BPAQ, have previously been 
linked to aggression, it was tested to see if these factors would predict LDT aggression scores 
in the control group as baseline effects.  A linear regression revealed that trait aggression did 
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not predict aggression scores in the control group, β = -.144, t(1) = -.821, p = .416, but an 
independent samples t-test was significant for sex, t(50.1)=2.046, p=.045.  In the control 
group, males had a mean aggression score (and standard deviation) of 11.40(50.41), whereas 
females had a mean aggression score (and standard deviation) of -12.52(36.37). 
 A 2 (Sex) x 3 (Condition) ANOVA was conducted to test if the sex differences in 
baseline would create an interaction between sex and condition; the interaction was not 
significant, F(2,192) = .374, p = .689.  Similarly, a 2 (Sex) x 3 (Type-of-Scene) ANOVA was 
conducted only on those participants in the experimental conditions to explore a sex by type-
of-scene interaction.  This interaction was not significant, F(2,132) = .172, p = .842.  These 
null results suggest males and females were not affected differentially based on condition; 
therefore, the following analyses were collapsed across sex. 
Priming of Aggression and Movie-Related Concepts 
 Hypothesis I stated that participants in the experimental conditions would be primed 
for aggression and for movie concepts as compared to the control condition.  The mean 
indices for aggression and movie related words are presented in Table 5.  A one-way 
ANOVA was conducted to determine if the two conditions of participants that completed the 
lexical decision task after watching the movie responded faster to the aggressive words than  
Table 5. Mean aggressive and movie scores by condition. 
 
 Condition N Mean Std. Deviation 
Aggression Score Surface 72   9.4146 44.52193 
 Depth 66 10.9875 50.39522 
 Control 60 -1.3555 45.62401 
     Movie Score Surface 72 15.3656 40.25912 
 Depth 66 15.2692 45.74242 




the control words, as compared to the control condition.  There was no significant effect, 
F(2,195) = 1.282, p = .280.  Additionally, an independent samples t-test was conducted 
comparing the experimental groups (collapsing the surface and depth conditions) and the 
control group; the test was not significant despite the means being in the expected direction, 
t(116) = 1.615, p = .109.  A second one-way ANOVA was conducted to look at the priming 
of movie-related words.  There was no significant effect, F(2, 195) = 1.076, p = .383.  The 
independent samples t-test comparing the collapsed surface and depth conditions with the 
control group was also not significant, but the means were again in the expected direction, 
t(119.15) = 1.508, p = .134. 
 Three one-sample t-tests were conducted to further investigate if the two 
experimental groups were primed for aggression.  For each condition, the indexed aggression 
score was tested for being different from zero.  In theory, if the scores are significantly 
different from zero, this would indicate that participants reliably responded faster to the 
aggressive words than to the control words.  For the surface condition, the mean aggression 
score was marginally significantly different from zero, t(71) = 1.794, p = .077; for the depth 
condition, the mean aggression score was also marginally significantly different form zero, 
t(65) = 1.771, p = .081.  For the control condition, the mean aggression score was not 
significantly different from zero, t(59) = -.230, p = .819.   
 Three additional one-sample t-tests were conducted to investigate if the two 
experimental groups were primed for the movie-related words.  For each condition, the 
indexed movie score was tested for being different from zero.  For the surface condition, the 
mean movie score was significantly different from zero, t(71) = 3.239; p = .002; for the depth 
condition, the mean movie score was also significantly different from zero, t(65) = 2.712, p = 
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.009.  For the control condition, the mean movie score was not significantly different from 
zero, t(59) = 1.111, p = .217.  Although neither the one-way ANOVA nor the independent 
samples t-test were significant, these one-sample t-test results suggest that participants in the 
experimental conditions, both surface and depth, were marginally primed for aggression and 
primed for the movie, while those in the control condition were not. 
Attention and Aggression Score 
 Hypothesis II predicted that those participants who attended to orthogonal scenes 
would be less primed for aggression than those who attended to aggressive scenes.  This 
analysis only looked at the participants in the experimental conditions because the control 
group completed the LDT before watching the movie; therefore, what scene they attended to 
would not be able to predict their aggression score.  To determine if the aggression score 
changed as a function of type-of-scene attended to, a one-way ANOVA was conducted.  The 
results were not significant, F(2,135) = .096, p = .908.  To test attention to aggressive scenes 
compared to attention to orthogonal scenes more definitively, an independent samples t-test 
was conducted of just these two groups.  The results were also not significant, t(106.15) = 
.303, p = .762. 
Attention and Difference Score 
 Hypothesis III predicted that participants who attended to orthogonal scenes would be 
more primed for movie-related words than for aggression-related words, whereas the 
opposite was expected for those who attended to aggressive scenes.  A one-way ANOVA 
was conducted for type-of-scene with the difference score as the dependent variable in order 
to test if the magnitude of the movie priming was greater or less than the aggressive priming.  
The test was significant, F(2,135) = 3.9, p = .023; however, it was not in the expected 
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direction.  Participants who chose an aggressive scene had a mean difference score (and 
standard deviation) of -13.51 (36.63), indicating they responded faster to movie-related 
words than aggressive words.  Participants who chose an orthogonal scene had a mean 
difference score (and standard deviation) of 6.45 (37.94), suggesting they may have been 
slightly more primed for aggression (See Figure 5).  Pair-wise comparisons revealed that the 
scores were significantly different for those participants who selected an orthogonal scene 
and those who selected an aggressive scene, mean difference = 19.959, t(101.19) = 2.775, p = 
.007.  The orthogonal – mix and the mix – aggressive comparisons were both non-significant, 
t(58.4) = 1.557, p = .125; t(53.22) = .705, p = .484, respectively. 
Interaction of Attention and Processing for Aggression Score 
 Hypothesis IV stated there would be an interaction between attention and level of 

























Figure 5. Mean difference score by type-of-scene. 
Error Bars: 95% CI 











































aggression.  A 2(Condition) X 3 (Type-of-Scene) ANOVA was conducted to see if there 
would be an interaction between level of processing and type-of-scene for aggression scores.  
The interaction was not significant, F(2, 132) = 1.235, p = .294.   
Interaction of Attention and Processing for Difference Score 
 Hypothesis V predicted there would be a polarization for the main effect of scene 
predicted in hypothesis III, where the magnitude of priming would be stronger in the depth 
condition according to what was attended to.  A 2(Condition) X 3(Type-of-Scene) ANOVA 
was conducted for the difference score.  The interaction was not significant, F(2,132) = 
1.775, p = .173, but there was a main effect for type of scene, F(2,132) = 4.460, p = .013.  
Despite the interaction being non-significant, the depth condition did appear to pull the effect 


























Figure 6. Mean difference score by type-of-scene and condition. 
Error Bars: 95% CI 













































than those in the surface condition (See Figure 6).  The results of the pair-wise comparisons 
are presented in Table 6, and show that the simple main effect of orthogonal compared to 
aggressive scene difference scores was significantly different in the depth condition. 
Summary of Primary Results 
 The only primary hypothesis that was supported by the data was that participants in 
the experimental conditions were primed for aggression and movie related words, as 
determined by a one-sample t-test that compared the indexed aggression score to zero.  
Although there was a significant main effect of type-of-scene on the difference score, it was 
not in the hypothesized directions.  Furthermore, there was a trend towards polarization as 
hypothesized, but the interaction was not significant. 
Table 6.  Pair-wise comparisons for condition by scene. 
 





Surface Condition      
 Orthogonal - Aggressive 1.059 54.06 0.294 7.98 7.537 
 Orthogonal - Mix 0.369 10.253 0.719 6.074 16.45 
 Aggressive - Mix -0.118 9.709 0.907 -1.907 16.212 
       
Depth Condition      
 Orthogonal - Aggressive 2.672 43.680 0.011 35.553 13.304 
 Orthogonal - Mix 1.796 41.890 0.080 21.862 12.171 
 Aggressive - Mix -1.099 39.270 0.279 -13.692 12.469 
       
Orthogonal Scene      
 Surface - Depth -1.401 38.482 0.164 -15.174 10.828 
       
Mix Scene      
 Surface - Depth 0.035 12.437 0.972 0.614 17.364 
       
Aggressive Scene      





 Although the hypotheses regarding attention and level-of-processing were not 
supported by the primary analyses, it may be that there are other variables that do result in 
differences in the aggression and movie scores.  If the randomization process was successful, 
it is possible that these differences were averaged out in the manipulated groups.  
Particularly, people may have an inclination for how they will choose to watch a movie and 
the manipulation may not have been effective.  A variety of potential depth measures were 
included in this study to explore other ways people may approach movies. 
Manipulation Check 
 Before looking into personality variables, it is of interest to check if the manipulation 
worked.  Although 100% of participants indicated during the debriefing interview that they 
had no difficulties following the directions on how to watch the movie, a more objective 
method was included.  The following coding scheme was applied to the striking scene 
questions to determine if participants were able to follow the directions they were given on 
how to watch the movie. 
 As the directions for the intended depth condition specifically asked participants to 
pay attention to ‘details, themes, and messages’ and compared the way they should watch the 
movie to an “English class,” a coding scheme was developed using critical approaches to 
literature to distinguish between those participants who were attempting to derive a deeper 
meaning from the movie and those who remained on a surface or plot level.  Similar to the 
type-of-scene coding, each participant was randomly assigned a second identification number 
that blinded the raters to the participants’ condition.  Raters read both scene descriptions and 
discussions for all 208 participants and rated the first two scenes mentioned individually.  For 
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any participant who discussed more than two scenes, only the first two were coded. 
 Two passes through the responses were involved in the coding process.  The first pass 
through the data had each rater independently assign each scene to one of three 
classifications: ‘depth,’ ‘borderline-depth,’ and ‘surface.’  Scenes were rated ‘surface’ if the 
discussion did not include any information regarding meaning.  Scenes were rated ‘depth’ or 
‘borderline-depth’ if participants used one of five approaches in an attempt to get at a deeper 
level of meaning in the scene.  The ‘borderline-depth’ category was for those participants 
who were on the border between surface and depth.  This category was necessary for the first 
pass as many responses were not clearly ‘depth’ or ‘surface.’ 
 The five approaches to meaning were: moral, personal, literary-device, literary-
characterization, and literary-theme (Seldon, 1989).  The moral approach was defined as 
participants discussing rules of behavior or mores that could be inferred from the movie; this 
did not involve making judgments on the moral behavior of the characters, but rather taking 
an “Aesop’s Fables” approach to the ‘moral of the story.’  The personal approach involved 
participants relating something in the scene to something in their personal lives in order to 
derive meaning from the movie; a participant discussing something along the lines of ‘I liked 
the farm scene because I lived on a farm’ was not sufficient to classify as depth-personal 
because there was no attempt at finding meaning.  The literary approach was broken into 
three sub-groups: device, characterization, and theme.  Literary-device was defined as 
participants who used literary jargon or implied the use of techniques like foreshadowing or 
symbolism in the discussion.  Once again, using this approach to discern meaning was 
required, and misusing a literary term did not guarantee a ‘depth’ rating.  Literary-
characterization was defined as those discussions that described the growth of characters in 
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the movie, and literary-theme included those responses that mentioned over-arching themes 
of the movie; again, using the approach to derive meaning was required.  Although these 
approaches were necessary to help the raters understand what classified as ‘depth’, the 
classification of these scenes into each category was not used in further analyses.  
 For any scenes where the raters disagreed on the code to assign, one of two actions 
was taken.  If raters disagreed between ‘surface’/’borderline depth,’ or ‘borderline 
depth’/’depth,’ a consensus was reached to pick one of the two ratings.  If the raters 
disagreed between ‘surface’/’depth,’ a ‘borderline depth’ rating was assigned without further 
discussion.  The second pass through the responses required raters to independently return to 
all scenes rated ‘borderline depth’ and make a second judgment, forcing the scene into either 
the ‘surface’ or ‘depth’ rating.  This time when raters disagreed, a consensus was reached.  
The final dichotomous split of ‘surface’ or ‘depth’ was meant to serve as the manipulation 
checks.  To avoid rater drift, classifications were compared and discussed every 15-40 
participants.  An inter-rater reliability coefficient was calculated for the two raters on the 
dichotomous ratings, Κ = .863, p < .001.  A chi-square was calculated and revealed a relation 
between the ‘surface’/’depth’ rating in the first and second scene, χ2(1) = 12.423, p < .001.  
For this reason, the ratings for both of the participants’ scenes were combined to create a 
single, dichotomous level-of-meaning variable.  In the experimental conditions, a total of 96 
participants were given a ‘surface’ rating and 42 received a ‘depth’ rating. 
 To determine if the manipulations of the surface and depth conditions were 
successful, a chi-square was calculated comparing level-of-meaning and condition. 
Participants in the control condition were left out of this analysis as they were not instructed 
on how to watch the movie.  The test was not significant, suggesting that the manipulation  
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Table 7. Percentage of level-of-meaning ratings by condition. 
 
 Level-of-Meaning 
Condition Surface Depth 
Surface 36.2% 16.0% 
Depth 33.3% 14.5% 
 
did not work, χ2(1) = .001; p = .974.  Table 7 shows the frequencies for each level of 
meaning by condition cell. 
 Hypotheses IV and V were retested using level-of-meaning as the level-of-processing 
variable instead of condition; however, both 2(Level-of-Meaning) X 3(Type-of-Scene) 
ANOVAs were not significant, F(2,132) = 2.090, p = .128; F(2,132) = .713, p = .492, 
respectively.  To test attention to aggressive scenes compared to attention to orthogonal 
scenes more definitively, a 2(Level-of-Meaning) X 2(Aggressive/Orthogonal) ANOVA was 
conducted.  The interactions were still not significant, F(1,105) = .001, p = .980; F(1,105) = 
1.231, p = .270, respectively.  The main effect of type-of-scene on the difference score 
became significant, F(1, 105) = 4.418, p = .038, but, again, in the opposite direction than 
predicted .  Unlike the results of hypothesis IV with condition as the depth variable, the 
polarization trend did not appear when the groups were split by surface or depth levels of 
meaning (See Table 8).  
Table 8. Mean difference scores for level-of-meaning by type-of-scene. 
 Level-of-Meaning Type-of-Scene  N Mean Std. Deviation 
Surface Orthogonal  31 12.9743 40.02142 
 Aggressive  49 -13.621 38.58017 
      
Depth Orthogonal  18 -4.7801 32.04152 






 The purpose of this set of analyses was to determine if personality variables could 
serve as a better operational definition of level-of-processing in hypotheses IV and V.  As the 
question of interest here is related to the difference in priming after watching the movie, the 
control condition was excluded in the analyses.  The following scales were examined as 
potential measures of level-of-processing: the total AEQ, its four subscales (thinking, feeling, 
escaping, and absorption), the AEQ emotive scale (the combined scores of the feeling, 
escaping, and absorption subscales), the QMEE, the NFC, and the four subscales of the KTS 
(Extrovert/Introvert, Sensing/Intuition, Thinker/Feeler, and Judger/Perceiver).  The 
additional variables of sex and trait aggression were used as control variables because they 
are not appropriate measures of processing but have previously been found to predict 
aggressive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.  The potential that sex or trait aggression could 
be a better predictor over and above a personality measure was not overlooked and was 
addressed when necessary.   
  Hypotheses IV and V were retested in four separate analyses (See Table 9). First, an 
overall investigation was conducted to determine if any personality measures were related to 
the aggression score for all participants in the experimental conditions (collapsed across 
surface and depth conditions).  Any measures that emerged as predicting aggression score 
were then tested for an interaction with type-of-scene.   
 Second, a further investigation into predictors of the aggression score was conducted, 
but the surface and depth conditions were tested separately to determine if there was an 
interaction between participants’ natural viewing style and the way they were instructed on 
how to watch the movie.  Again, any measures that emerged as predicting aggression score  
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Table 9. Layout of Exploratory Analyses. 
 
Analysis Scales Condition Type-of-Scene Response Variable 
1a All Collapsedb All Aggression Score 
1b Emergenta Collapsedb Eachc Aggression Score 
     
2a All Surface All Aggression Score 
2b Emergenta Surface Eachc Aggression Score 
2c All Depth All Aggression Score 
2d Emergenta Depth Eachc Aggression Score 
     
3a All Collapsedb All Difference Score 
3b Emergenta Collapsedb Eachc Difference Score 
     
4a All Surface All Difference Score 
4b Emergenta Surface Eachc Difference Score 
4c All Depth All Difference Score 
4d Emergenta Depth Eachc Difference Score 
Note. aOnly variables that emerged as significant predictors in the prior test were 
used; bSurface and depth conditions are collapsed together;  cRegressions were 
conducted separately for each type-of-scene, or Type-of-Scene was included as 
a factor in an ANOVA. 
 
for either condition were then tested for an interaction with type-of-scene.  This block also 
included an 2(Level-of-Meaning) X 2(Condition) X 3(Type-of-Scene) ANOVA for 
aggression score to explore if a participants’ actual discussion of meaning would interact 
with condition and type-of-scene.  Although the main effect of level-of-meaning tested 
during the manipulation check was non-significant, this test was included as a further 
investigation of whether natural viewing style and how one is told to watch would interact. 
 The third and fourth analyses repeated the method above.  These looked for an overall 
predictor of the difference score and then tested for predictors by condition.  These two 
analyses offered information regarding whether the viewer was more primed for aggressive 
or movie-related concepts.  In the following analyses, all personality measures were 




Analysis 1: General depth predictors of aggression score 
 As each of the above measures was tested as a measure of the same construct (level-
of-processing) and were generally correlated, linear regressions were conducted separately 
on the continuous variables (AEQ, including its subscales, QMEE, and NFC) and 
independent t-tests were run on the subscales of the KTS (excluding the ‘X’ classifications 
where the participant scored equally for each type) to determine if any factors predicted the 
aggression score for all experimental participants.  The Thinker/Feeler subscale of the KTS 
was marginally significant for aggression score, t(124)=1.853, p=.006, but after including the 
X classification and controlling for sex, the effect became non-significant, F(2,204) = 1.757, 
p = .178.  None of the other variables were found to have significant effects.  Since no factors 
emerged as overall general predictors of aggression score, an interaction with type-of-scene 
was not tested.  These null results suggest that no personality measures included in this study 
predicted which participants were more primed for aggression after watching the movie. 
Analysis 2: Condition by natural depth for aggression score 
 There may be an interaction between how one would naturally process a movie and 
how he or she was told to watch it.  To investigate this, participants were split based on their 
manipulated condition to see if any of the personality measures would predict the aggression 
score, again, the control condition was not included in the analysis.  Two factors emerged as 
predicting aggression score: one for the surface condition and one for the depth condition. 
 For the surface condition, the Thinker/Feeler subscale of the KTS was significantly 
related to aggression score, even after controlling for sex and trait aggression and including 
the X classification, F(2,59) = 3.408, p = .040.  Participants classified as Thinkers had a 
higher mean aggression score.  This would suggest that those participants who are more 
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inclined to consider things objectively and logically were more primed for aggression 
(Keirsey & Bates, 1984).  For the depth condition, the NFC scale significantly predicted 
aggression score after controlling for sex and trait aggression, β = -.297, t(54) = -2.312, p = 
.025. Contrary to those people in the surface condition, this suggests that the less need for 
cognition participants had, the more likely they were to be primed for aggression. 
 To test for an interaction between level-of-processing, as defined by the 
Thinker/Feeler variable, and attention for the surface condition, a 3(Type-of-Scene) X 
3(Thinker/X/Feeler) ANCOVA was run, controlling for sex and trait aggression. The 
interaction was not significant, F(4,53) = 1.169, p = .335.  The interaction was also tested for 
level-of-processing being defined by the NFC.  For the depth condition only, linear 
regressions were conducted on each type of scene for NFC on aggression score, controlling 
for sex and trait aggression.  NFC was found to be a significant predictor only for those 
participants in the depth condition who selected an aggressive scene, β = -.467, t(18) = -
2.237, p = .038, indicating that lower need for cognition only predicts higher aggression 
scores for participants in the depth condition who chose an aggressive scene, whereas need 
for cognition did not predict aggression score for those who attended to the other scene types 
(See Figure 6). 
  Finally, a 2(Type-of-Scene) X 2(Level-of-Meaning) X 2(Condition) ANOVA was run 
to investigate if natural level-of-processing, as defined by actual discussion of meaning in the 
striking scenes questions, would have an interaction with scene and condition. The three-way 
interaction was not significant, F (1,101) = .029, p = .865.   
Analysis 3: General depth predictors of difference score 
 The same exploratory analyses were conducted to test if any of the personality 
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Note: Scatterplot for Aggressive type-of-scene only
 
Figure 7. Scatter plot of NFC on aggression score for aggressive scene. 
  
variables would predict whether participants were more primed for aggression or more 
primed for movie-related words, using the difference score as the dependent variable.  The 
NFC scale, after controlling for sex and trait aggression, predicted the difference score, with 
less need for cognition predicting more priming for aggression than movie-related words, β = 
-.178, t(118) = -2.003, p = .047.  Although it is not a measure of processing, it is worth 
nothing that the independent samples t-test for sex was significant, t(136) = 3.103, p = .002, 
with females being more primed for movie related words compared to aggression words and 
males being slightly more primed for aggressive words than movie words, M(SD) = 
14.67(36.82), M(SD) = 4.93(37.38), respectively. 
 The interaction between NFC and type-of-scene was tested by conducting separate 
linear regressions of NFC on the difference score for each type of scene.  Type-of-scene was 
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not included in the regression as a predictor variable due to the qualitative nature of the 
factor. After controlling for trait aggression and sex, the NFC scale significantly predicted 
difference score for those who chose an aggressive scene, β = -.311, t(52) = -2.452, p = .018, 
with less need for cognition predicting that participants were more primed for aggression 
than for the movie-related concepts.  This result corresponds with the finding that less need 
for cognition was related to high aggression scores. 
Analysis 4: Condition by natural depth difference score 
 As with the aggression scores, it was further investigated to see if any of the 
personality measures would predict the difference score when participants were split based 
on their manipulated condition; again, the control condition was not included in the analysis. 
Four personality measures emerged as predicting difference scores: three for the surface 
condition and one for the depth. 
 For the surface condition, the feeling subscale of the AEQ, the escape subscale of the 
AEQ, and the emotive subscale of the AEQ were marginally significant predictors for 
aggression scores after controlling for sex and trait aggression, with higher feeling, escape, 
and emotion scores resulting in lower difference scores (See Table 10).  These results suggest 
that the more emotionally involved participants were in the movie, the more likely they 
would be more primed for movie-related concepts than for aggressive ones.  It should also be 
noted that the independent samples t-test for sex was significant, t(69.9) = 2.080, p = .041, 
with females being more primed for movie-related words than aggression words.   
 For the depth condition, the NFC scale was a marginally significant predictor of 
difference score after controlling for sex and trait aggression (See Table 10), again 
suggesting that the higher participants need for cognition, the more likely they were to be 
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primed for movie-related concepts than aggressive ones.  Sex was significant for the depth 
condition as well, with females being more primed for movie-related words than aggression 
words, t(59.9) = 2.351, p = .022. 
 To test for an interaction between level-of-processing, as defined by the three AEQ 
subscales, and type-of-scene for the surface condition, separate regressions were conducted 
controlling for sex and trait aggression on the differences score.  The escape subscale and the 
emotion subscale predicted difference scores only for those participants who selected an 
aggressive scene (see Table 10).  These results suggest it was only for those participants who 
chose an aggressive scene that being emotionally involved in the movie was related to more 
priming for movie-related words than aggressive words. 
Table 10. Feeling and thinking predictors of difference score. 
 Variable Condition Scene β T p 
AEQ Feel Surface Overall -0.211 -1.713 0.092 
  Orthogonal -0.100 -0.418 0.681 
  Mix -0.261 -0.500 0.644 
  Aggressive -0.248 -1.390 0.175 
 
AEQ Escape Surface Overall -0.216 -1.758 0.084 
  Orthogonal 0.111 0.422 0.678 
  Mix -0.388 -0.820 0.458 
  Aggressive -0.354 -2.070 0.047 
 
AEQ Emotion Surface Overall -0.244 -1.972 0.053 
  Orthogonal 0.032 0.126 0.901 
  Mix -0.460 -0.856 0.440 
  Aggressive -0.347 -2.005 0.054 
 
NFC Depth Overall -0.237 -1.840 0.071 
  Orthogonal -0.212 -0.787 0.435 
  Mix -0.057 -0.189 0.853 
  Aggressive -0.487 -2.633 0.017 




 To test for an interaction between processing and attention for the depth condition, 
linear regressions were conducted for each type of scene for NFC on aggression score, 
controlling for sex and trait aggression.  NFC was found to be a significant predictor only for 
those participants with an aggressive type-of-scene (See Table 10).  This result is consistent 
with previous NFC findings that the lower participants were on need for cognition the more 
likely they were to be primed for aggressive words than for movie-related words. 
 Finally, a 2(type of scene) X 2(level-of-meaning) X 2(condition) ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate if natural level-of-processing, as defined by actual discussion of 
meaning in the striking scene responses, would have an interaction with scene and condition.  
The three-way interaction was marginally significant, F(1,101) = 2.834, p = .095.  The means 
for these groups are presented in Table 11, and they show that the polarization effect only 
occurred for those participants who did not discuss meaning in their striking scene responses. 
 Overall, the results of these exploratory analyses showed that Need for Cognition 
consistently emerged as a predictor for those participants who were in the depth condition.   
Table 11. Three-way interaction of difference score by condition, level-of-meaning, and 
type-of-scene 
 Level-of-Meaning Condition Type-of-Scene  N Mean Std. Deviation 
Surface Surface Orthogonal  14 1.186 34.84861 
  Aggressive  31 -6.8696 30.83757 
       
 Depth Orthogonal  17 22.6824 42.36462 
  Aggressive  18 -25.2483 47.93959 
       
Depth Surface Orthogonal  11 -3.7366 18.5518 
  Aggressive  7 -18.2188 29.47789 
       
 Depth Orthogonal  7 -6.4199 48.27129 




Lower need for cognition repeatedly predicted both being more primed for aggression in 
general and being more primed for aggressive concepts than for movie-related concepts.  No 
single variable emerged as a consistent predictor for those participants in the surface 
condition.  The Thinker/Feeler subscale of the KTS was related to aggression scores for those 
participants in the surface condition.  A classification of ‘Thinker’ was associated with higher 
aggression scores, or being more primed for aggression.  The feeling, escaping, and emotive 
subscales of the AEQ were related to differences scores for participants in the surface 
condition.  Higher scores on each of these scales predicted more priming of movie-related 
words than aggressive ones.  Finally, there did appear to be a three-way interaction between 
level-of-meaning, condition, and type-of-scene.  The hypothesized effect that a deeper level-
of-processing would increase the magnitude of priming only occurred for those participants 
who did not discuss meaning in their striking scene responses. 
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CHAPTER 5.  DISCUSSION 
 As movies are filled with a variety of images, motifs, and messages, it is important to 
consider what viewers attend to and the level of processing they engage in when discussing 
the effects of the media.  Because previous aggression research has suggested that semantic 
priming is one of the cognitive routes to aggression (Berkowitz, 1984; Lindsey & Anderson, 
2000), and research in semantic priming has shown that the magnitude of semantic priming 
can change based on attention and levels of processing (Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2007; Woltz 
& Was, 2006), it is important to merge these findings into a more complete understanding of 
violent media effects.   The current study attempted to investigate how attention and levels of 
processing would affect the magnitude of aggressive priming after viewing of violent movie. 
Priming 
 The first objective of this study was to establish that the participants were primed for 
both aggressive and movie-related concepts.  The test comparing the two experimental 
groups to the control group, who completed the lexical task before watching the movie, 
suggested that priming may not have occurred after watching the movie.  It was not the case, 
however, that participants were responding with equal mean reaction times to the aggressive, 
movie, and control words; instead, the control group also responded faster to the aggressive 
and movie words, making the control group not significantly different from the experimental 
groups.  The additional tests showed that, for the experimental groups, the movie and 
aggression scores were significantly and marginally significantly different from zero, 
respectively, while the scores for the control group were not.  It appears then, that the 
experimental groups were responding faster to the movie and aggressive words than to the 
control words, which supports the hypothesis that they were primed. 
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 There are a number of possibilities that could explain why the experimental groups 
and control groups were not significantly different in the current study.  The first is that there 
may be a quality of the aggression and movie words that would make them more accessible 
to begin with, compared to the control words that were used in the task.  Although all the 
words for the lexical decision task were chosen based on similar average reaction time and 
frequency of use from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et. al., 2002), they were not pre-
tested as three sets of words with matching qualities.  Furthermore, differential baseline 
reaction times to the words existed.  The males responded faster to the aggression words than 
the control words, while the females responded slower, before watching the movie.  These 
differences could also affect the variance of the groups, resulting in the non-significant 
results. 
 It is also possible that priming should not have been expected to occur from the 
movie in the first place.  Semantic priming is considered to be very short-lived, lasting only 
for seconds (Collins & Loftus, 1974; Neely, 1991), and the increased accessibility of certain 
types of words may have decayed before the participants completed the lexical decision tasks 
in the experimental conditions.  Other research, however, has suggested that semantic 
priming is not as short-term as originally thought (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Becker, 
Moscovitch, Behrmann, & Joordens, 1997).  Because the cognitive route to aggression 
includes the phenomenon of semantic priming, according to the GAM, it is worth further 
investigating how long the effects last or if the person is no longer primed when leaving the 
movie theater. 
 Finally, this study was a between-subjects design and could not fully test if the 
participants were actually primed.  The priming hypothesis was tested between the 
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experimental and control conditions, but as the sex baseline test showed, there is reason to 
suspect that there was a large amount of variance between participants.  Participants in the 
experimental conditions ranged from responding to aggressive words 200 ms faster to 200 
ms slower than the control words, with an average difference of 15 ms.  It may be that 
comparing reaction times to a different set of participants is not the most accurate measure of 
priming.  Instead, future research should compare participants’ reaction times after watching 
the movie to their own, within-group, reaction times before the movie.  Although this will not 
eliminate all possible alternative hypotheses, it may offer information on individual 
differences in the semantic priming of a movie. 
Attention 
 Previous research has shown that attention can influence the magnitude of semantic 
priming because attention allocates cognitive resources towards one concept and away from 
another (Dark, et al., 1985; Otaku & Kawaguchi, 2007; Smith, et al., 2001).  Based on this 
idea, hypothesis II predicted that participants who attended to the aggressive scenes would be 
more primed for aggression than those who attended to orthogonal scenes.  Similarly, 
hypotheses III stated that participants who attended to orthogonal scenes would be more 
primed for movie-related words than aggressive words, as compared to those who attended to 
aggressive scenes.  These hypotheses were not supported by the data.  Although there was no 
difference in aggression score among the three types of scenes, the test of the difference 
score was significant, but in the opposite direction than predicted.  Those participants who 
attended to an orthogonal scene were more primed for the aggressive than the movie words, 
while those participants who attended to the aggressive scenes were more primed for the 
movie words than for the aggressive ones.   
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 Although this outcome is the opposite of the predicted result, there are a few possible 
explanations that can be considered.  The first possibility is that using the first scene selected 
as the type-of-scene was not an accurate measure of attention.  By writing down the first 
scene that came to mind, there may be no correlation between this type of scene and what the 
participants paid attention to overall during the movie.  This is further supported by the fact 
that there was no relation between what type of scene participants chose for their first and 
second scenes.  If they initially chose an aggressive scene, there was no pattern to suggest 
they would pick an aggressive scene as their second choice. 
 There is a second possibility that the coding scheme used to identify type of scene 
was too simplified for the context of a full-length movie.  Any concept that was related to 
hurting, whether it was inflicting or preventing harm, was considered as part of the 
aggressive classification.  This was done under the assumption that the activation of the 
concept “not hurt” would still require the activation of the concept “hurt,” and spreading 
activation should still spread to related aggressive concepts.  For example, if the participant 
described the part of the scene where the antagonist put down his gun and the conflict ended, 
this was coded as aggressive.  The presence of the gun in the scene, even if was not being 
used, should still elicit the previously established ‘weapons effect’ and prime the aggressive 
words related to gun.  Nevertheless, it may be that harming concepts and not-harming 
concepts do not belong on the same continuum and activation spreads to different networks.   
 Similarly, the non-aggressive scenes were all lumped together in the orthogonal 
category.  It may be that some scenes or storylines were more related than others to the 
aggressive ideas present in the movie, even if there was no violence in the scene or 
aggression mentioned in the discussion.  For example, one scene that was chosen by a 
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number of participants took place in the police station where the little boy is looking through 
mug shots and eventually finds a photograph of the perpetrator in a newspaper clipping.  
Many participants discussed this scene in terms of looking at the boy in a new place or the 
way that the police officer did not doubt the boy’s accusation despite their differences.  
Because the scene itself did not have any acts of aggression in it, and the discussion was 
related to the ideas of culture or new experiences, it would have received a rating of 
orthogonal.  It may be, however, that because the scene itself is so integral to the violent 
storyline, the participant’s attention during the entire film was still on the aggressive aspects. 
 There is a third possibility that could also explain the opposite direction of the effect, 
one that allows for the coding of type-of-scene as a measure of attention to still be considered 
somewhat accurate.  The participants were specifically asked to describe the scene they 
found to be “the most striking.”  They were further instructed, “This could be either your 
favorite scene or one that you just found particularly memorable.”  The first scene chosen 
may have been particularly striking because it was different from everything else the 
participant was attending to during the movie.  For instance, if the participant spent the 
movie attending to the romantic relationship between the two main characters, they may have 
found one of the aggressive scenes striking because it was so different from that on which 
they focused.  Similarly, if the participant was invested in the aggressive storyline, a non-
aggressive scene that focused on community building and social support could have been 
striking because it was in such contrast to the violence.   
 In this case, the type of scene classification could be an indicator of the types of 
concepts they were not paying attention to for the majority of the movie.  Furthermore, the 
opposite direction of the results could then be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis.  If 
  
64 
participants initially chose an orthogonal scene because it was different from the aggression 
they had been paying attention to, then the results showed they were more likely to be primed 
for aggression.  Similarly, if the participants initially chose an aggressive scene as most 
striking because they had been attending to one of the non-violent storylines, then the results 
showed they were more likely to be primed for the movie.  Further research is needed to test 
this possible alternative explanation of the results found in the current study. 
Level of Processing 
 In addition to the analyses on attention, hypotheses IV and V predicted that there 
would be an interaction between type of scene and condition for both the aggression and 
difference scores.  This interaction was predicted from previous research (Lang, 2000; Woltz 
& Was, 2006) by incorporating level of processing with attention, suggesting that, for all 
participants who attended to one type of scene, a deeper level of processing would result in a 
larger priming effect.  Although neither interaction was significant, pair-wise comparisons of 
the difference score showed a trend toward polarization.  The main effect of scene, with 
participants who selected an orthogonal scene being more primed for aggression and 
participants who selected an aggressive scene being more primed for the movie, was stronger 
in the depth condition than in the surface condition.  Although the scene effects were not in 
the predicted direction, the trend of the effect being larger for the depth condition is 
congruent with the theory that a deeper level of processing would increase the magnitude of 
the priming effect. 
 Although the polarization of the depth condition was not significant in the test of 
hypothesis V, the three-way interaction of type-of-scene, condition, and processing as 
defined by the ratings of the striking scene responses was marginally significant, despite the 
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different number of participants in each group with some groups being small in number.  In 
particular, the polarization effect was found only for those participants who were rated as 
having a surface level of processing, based on their striking scene responses.  For participants 
rated as ‘surface,’ the main effect for scene was larger for participants who were instructed to 
pay attention to messages than for those instructed to relax.  For participants whose responses 
were rated as ‘depth,’ this pattern was not found. 
 This finding seems to simultaneously support and contradict the polarization 
hypothesis.  On the one hand, for those participants whose responses were rated as ‘surface,’ 
those who were told to engage on a deeper level had larger effects for both types of scene.  
On the other hand, those participants whose responses were rated as ‘depth’ only had an 
increase in magnitude of effect if they were in the surface condition and selected an 
aggressive scene initially.  It appears that there may be an interaction between how a person 
may choose to watch a movie and how he or she is told to watch it, because the surface-
condition/depth-rating and the depth-condition/surface-rating groups were the only ones to 
demonstrate any strength of priming while the congruent groups (surface/surface, 
depth/depth) had very similar aggression and movie scores.  Perhaps simply having 
incongruent instructions and tendencies actually created a situation where participants were 
more focused on the movie because they were asked to behave in a way different than was 
normal for them. 
 There are, of course, a number of possibilities that would suggest this marginally 
significant finding is merely an artifact of other confounding variables; these may also 
contribute to why the two-way interactions were not significant.  As with the type-of-scene 
analysis, the interactions between attention and level of processing may not have been 
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significant because the method used to establish what the participants attended to was not 
sufficient.  Similarly, the manipulations used in the surface and depth conditions may not 
have been sufficient to elicit true surface and depth levels of processing.  The manipulation 
check indicated that there was no relation between how participants were told to watch the 
movie and how they actually watched it; however, the three-way interaction described above 
suggests it may have still had an effect.   
 Furthermore, it may be that the coding scheme used to determine surface and depth 
processing from the striking scene questions was insufficient.  The coding scheme divided 
participants into dichotomous categories; however, it may have been more appropriate to 
place participants along a continuum instead, as addressed in the initial need for a 
‘borderline-depth’ category.  It is also important to recognize that the surface/depth ratings 
were based on the ability of the participants to derive meaning from the scene.  The coding 
scheme was devised in this way in order to serve as a manipulation check, as participants 
were specifically instructed to think about “ideas, themes, and messages” within the movie.  
Nevertheless, the requirement of deriving meaning may be only one possible level of 
processing among many.  In this way, participants may have actually processed the movie 
deeply, but not in a way that was recognized by the raters.  Similarly, the rating of depth was 
contingent on participants’ abilities to articulate their experience with the movie.  It may be 
that a number of the ‘borderline-depth’ participants were ultimately rated as ‘surface,’ not 
because they did not engage in the movie on a deep level, but rather because they could not 
articulate meaning sufficiently.   
Exploratory Discussion 
 The instructions given and the rating of striking scene responses were intended to 
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create and capture differences in level of processing.  It was recognized that the concept of 
viewing styles as described here does not yet have a definitive definition; therefore, 
exploratory analyses were included to determine if other variables could serve as level-of-
processing measures.  The hypotheses of attention and processing, for both the aggression 
and difference scores, were explored for the various personality measures included in the 
study.  What emerged for these analyses was a pattern where high feeling scores were 
correlated with lower aggression scores for participants in the surface condition.  Similarly, 
higher thinking scores were correlated with lower aggression scores for participants in the 
depth condition. 
 In the analysis of the aggression scores, the Thinker/Feeler subscale of the KTS 
(Figure 8) and the Need for Cognition scale (Figure 9) were the only measures that emerged 
as significant.  The Thinker/Feeler classifications were related to aggression scores for those 
participants in the surface condition, with the Thinkers having higher aggression scores.  In 
contrast, the NFC scale was a significant predictor for participants in the depth condition, but 
in the direction that a lower need for cognition results in a higher aggression score.  Although 
these findings may seem contradictory, neither scale was a significant predictor in the other 
condition.  It is not the case that NFC had a positive correlation with aggression scores in one 
condition and a negative correlation in the other.  It may, instead, be the case that they are 
measuring different cognitive constructs despite the ‘thinking’ label for both scales.  This 
interpretation is supported by the lack of correlation between these two scales (Table 3). 
 Only the NFC emerged as an overall predictor of difference score, when the surface 
and depth conditions were collapsed.  The test of the NFC by type-of-scene interaction 































Figure 8. Thinker/Feeler subscale relation with mean aggression scores 
collapsed across type-of-scene. 
 






















Figure 9. Need for cognition relation with mean aggression score 
collapsed across type-of-scene. 
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participants who selected an aggressive scene.  The higher the need for cognition, the more 
quickly participants responded to the movie-related words than the aggressive words.  When 
the potential processing variables were examined by condition the feeling, escaping, and 
emotive subscales of the AEQ were negatively correlated with the difference score for those 
participants in the surface condition (See Figure 10).  This suggests that the less feeling, less 
escaping, and less emotive scores the participants had, the faster they responded to the 
aggression words than to the movie words.  For the depth condition, the lower the NFC score 
the more primed the participants were for aggressive words than for movie-related words 
(See Figure 10).  
 By combining the results for the aggression score and the difference score on these 
exploratory analyses, a pattern can be discerned.  The Thinker/Feeler subscale of the KTS 
and the feeling, escaping, and emotive subscales of the AEQ emerged as predictors only in 
the surface condition.  Although the classification of Thinker in the KTS subscale might be 
assumed to be related to Need for Cognition, it instead may be more appropriate to compare 
it to its Feeler counterpart.  This interpretation is supported by the Thinker/Feeler subscale 
being significantly correlated with the feeling and emotive subscales of the AEQ, as well as 
the QMEE, but not correlated with the NFC scale (refer to Table 3 above).  ‘Not feeling’ may 
be the necessary interpretation for the predictor of high aggression scores.  In other words, 
for participants who were told to relax and not be involved in the movie, those participants 
who are inclined to become emotionally engaged were less primed for aggression.  For those 
people who were told to process the movie on a deeper level, it was the people who are 
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Figure 10. Feeling, escaping, emotive and need for cognition relations with difference score collapsed across type-of-scene. 
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 Although different constructs seem to be responsible for predicting aggression score 
in the surface and depth conditions, there appears to be a pattern that not thinking and not 
feeling result in higher aggression scores, which would be predicted if surface is defined as 
not thinking and not feeling.  Furthermore, when the level-of-processing by attention 
hypotheses were tested using these variables, the escaping and emotive subscale of the AEQ 
and the NFC had predictive power only for those participants who selected an aggressive 
scene.  Future research is needed to determine what constructs these scales are actually 
measuring and if there is a single construct (and appropriate measure) that would predict 
overall semantic priming regardless of condition and type of scene. 
Limitations of the Current Study 
 As has already been discussed to some extent, there are a number of limitations in the 
present study.  The coding schemes used for the type-of-scene and level-of-meaning 
variables were based on a limited number of possible ratings and may not have accurately 
reflected the attention and level-of-processing factors as intended.   
 Similarly, the entire study was designed according to two dichotomies: surface/depth 
and aggressive/orthogonal scenes.  Whereas this was convenient for coding and analysis 
purposes, it may not accurately reflect the reality of viewing styles and how they can 
influence the activation of concepts in the semantic network. For instance, in the lexical 
decision task the movie words were chosen as six relationship, six journey, six scene-
specific, and six Amish words.  Instead, it may have been appropriate to separate these four 
ideas into their own 24-word categories, and create four consummate categories for the type-
of-scene coding.  Similarly, for the type-of-scene coding, no distinction was made between 
aggressive and pro-social concepts; intentionally not hurting was coded as related to 
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aggression.  It may have been more appropriate to have coded these scenes separately and 
include a pro-social category of words in the lexical decision task.  This greater variety of 
categories to which participants could pay attention could have provided a richer view of the 
audience experience. 
 Besides variable level limitations, other areas of the current study could have been 
improved.  The words chosen for the aggressive, movie, and control categories in the lexical 
decision task were not pre-tested for similarity.  As a result, the participants in the control 
condition responded faster to the aggressive and movie words than to the control words, 
when it was expected that there would be no difference between the word types at baseline.  
The striking scene questions used at the end could also have been improved.  They were very 
simple questions that may not have provided enough information for the participants to 
answer the question fully.  More specific questions could have been asked regarding the 
participants’ experiences with the movie, such as what storyline they attended to, what they 
enjoyed, what they disliked, and perhaps any specific messages they discerned from the 
movie.  It may be beneficial to consider having the experimenter conduct the interviews in 
person; however, using the computer seems to have allowed enough anonymity that the 
participants may have answered more honestly than if talking to a person.   
 Another limitation is that only one movie was used.  Stimulus sampling (Wells & 
Windschitl, 1999) was not considered for the current study because the questions being asked 
were regarding differential effects among participants and not about reactions to movies as a 
whole.  Regardless of this, the conclusions that can be drawn from this study are limited 
because they may have come from features of the movie itself rather than actual differences 
among participants.  Future studies on viewing styles would need to incorporate a variety of 
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movies for strong external validity.   
 A final limitation of the current study is the lack of a proper viewing-styles control 
group.  The control group that existed in the study was used as a comparison group for 
priming, as they completed the lexical decision task before watching the movie.  There was 
no comparable control, however, for the instructions that were given to the participants in the 
surface and depth conditions on how to watch the movie.  If there are natural ways that 
viewers may approach movies, it will be necessary to include a group of participants that are 
given no instruction on how to watch the movie and then complete the dependent measure 
following the movie.  This is particularly important as the results from this study suggest 
there may be an effect when the instructions on movie watching are incongruent with one’s 
natural tendency. 
Implications 
 The General Aggression Model proposes that one short-term process responsible for 
aggressive behavior is the priming of aggressive concepts in the present internal state 
(Lindsey & Anderson, 2000). The presentation of an aggressive stimulus increases the 
accessibility of semantically related concepts through spreading activation.  This, in turn, 
increases the likelihood that an aggressive outcome will be selected during the decision 
making processes of an interaction.  The findings of the current study offer some insights into 
this process, and a few theoretical ideas that ought to be incorporated into the GAM as an 
explanatory model for media effects. 
 The first is that viewing styles, namely what the viewer attends to and how he or she 
processes this information, need to be considered in the GAM. The results of this study show 
that all participants were not equally primed for aggression, and attention and processing 
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were able to account for some of the differences in scores among participants.  Currently, the 
GAM includes a number of personal and situational inputs into a cycle that are used to 
explain differences in outcomes.  These inputs are factors such as trait aggression, parental 
involvement, and qualities of the perpetrator (Anderson et. al., 2003).  Attention and level-of-
processing should be included as inputs into the model.   
 The current approach would suggest that how a person processes a movie and what 
they choose to attend to are qualities of the person, as investigated in the exploratory analysis 
with personality measures.  The results of this study would also suggest, however, that 
processing could be considered a situational input, as supported by the interaction of natural 
processing with condition.  Following this, it could be assumed that attention could also be a 
situational, as well as personal, input.  For instance, a person may be naturally inclined to 
watch a movie in a particular way, but being told to attend to or process certain things could 
change their experience.  In this way, attention and processing are important factors to 
consider in what affects the present internal state. 
 Additionally, one current constraint of the GAM is that it is only a model of 
aggressive inputs and aggressive outcomes; it does not consider aggression in a fuller context 
where more than one concept is available for processing.  The current study, however, looked 
at how aggressive priming compared with other types of conceptual priming from the movie. 
The results suggest that the priming of aggression is not all or nothing; participants were 
primed for both aggression and for other movie-related concepts.  In particular are the 
findings that some participants were more primed for aggression than movie concepts, while 
others were more primed for movie concepts than aggressive ones.  Which type of concept 
activation is more likely to influence immediate behavior?  The aggression may have been 
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primed, but the non-violent, movie-related words were more easily accessible for some 
participants.  It may be the case, then, that during the appraisal stage of the GAM, the 
concepts of community building or romance would be more likely to influence behavior 
initially. 
 Although the current study cannot offer information for effects on behavior, the 
question of differential priming has important implications for future research on media 
violence effects, especially when considering media that use aggressive imagery to produce a 
non-violent message.  For example, violence and gore are staples of war films; however, this 
genre of movies often has anti-violent and anti-war themes.  The current state of the GAM 
would hypothesize that this type of film would result in an increase of aggressive concept 
accessibility.  If viewers are more primed for non-violent concepts than aggressive ones, 
though, would this still be the case?  The GAM would benefit from including the processing 
of other types of constructs, besides just aggression, as it tries to explain and predict 
aggressive behavior. 
 Finally, the limited support for the priming of aggressive cognitions in the current 
study needs to be considered for its implications on media violence research.  Previous 
aggression research has used isolated movie clips or static images to prime participants for 
aggression and has used measures of reaction times to individual concepts to assess 
accessibility of aggressive cognitions (Bushman & Geen, 1990; Leyens et al., 1976; Lindsey 
& Anderson, 2000).  These studies have measured how quickly a person responds to a 
variety of single-word targets, both in the reading reaction time task and the lexical decision 
task, after being primed by another single concept.  In the full movie context, however, there 
is not a single concept being primed.  Additionally, the viewer is generally using controlled 
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processing of some level to follow the storyline (Lang, 2000).  As automatic semantic 
priming, where the person is not using controlled processing, has been found to be very 
short-lived (Neely, 1991), these measures of short-term priming may not be appropriate for a 
full movie context.  Instead, research may benefit from using measures of schema activation 
or attitudinal priming to better measure the increased accessibility of aggressive cognitions, 
or other types of concepts, after watching a movie (Bargh et al., 1996; Fiske & Talyor, 1991). 
Conclusion 
 The current study was an investigation into how attention and level of processing may 
affect the magnitude of semantic priming of aggressive cognitions.  Although many of the 
hypotheses tested were not significant, a few effects emerged that supported the theories that 
what the viewer attends to and how deeply they process it can have differential effects on 
what the viewer is primed for and how strongly they are primed for it.  Specifically, the data 
supported the hypothesis that a deeper level of processing could potentially increase the 
magnitude of the effects. 
 More research is needed in the area of viewing styles, particularly in the development 
of a more concise operational definition.  Whereas level of processing and attention are 
important considerations for how a person may watch a movie, the types of needs viewers 
use the media to satisfy may offer a more appropriate construct through which to define 
viewing styles (Blumler & Katz, 1974).  Additionally, more research is needed in the area of 
semantic priming and the media.  As single words can elicit spreading activation and create a 
cognitive preparedness for related concepts, the effects of images, ideas, symbols, and 
messages in movies on the activations of schemas needs to be more fully investigated.  Is it 
the case that semantic priming decays at such a rapid rate that the increased accessibility of 
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certain concepts has faded by the time the credits fade, or is it possible that the contextual 
processing and meaningfulness of the movie create a stronger effect than a single word?   
 Finally, as semantic priming is one of the cognitive routes to aggression in the GAM, 
future research on viewing styles and schema accessibility has important implications in the 
media violence effects research.  Better understanding of attention and processing of the 
media and how they can serve as inputs in the GAM is needed.  Additionally, a 
comprehension of aggression in relation to other, non-aggressive concepts presented in the 
media would be beneficial.  Knowing how level of processing and attention could influence 
the effects of media violence would help in being able to predict who is at greater risk for an 




Anderson, C.A. (1989). Temperature and aggression: Ubiquitous effects of heat on 
occurrence of human violence. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 74-96. 
 
Anderson, C.A. (1997). Effects of violent movies and trait hostility on hostile feelings and 
aggressive thoughts. Aggressive Behavior, 23, 161-178. 
 
Anderson, C.A., Berkowitz, L., Donnerstein, E., Huesmann, L.R., Johnson, J.D., Liz, D., 
Malmuth, N.M., & Wartella, E. (2003). The influence of media violence on youth. 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4, 81-109. 
 
Anderson, C.A. & Bushman, B.J. (2002a). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 
53, 27-51. 
 
Anderson, C.A. & Bushman, B.J. (2002b). The effects of violence on society. Science, 295, 
2377-2379. 
 
Anderson, C.A. & Carnagey, N.L. (2004). Violent evil and the general aggression model. In 
A. Miller (Ed.), The social psychology of good and evil (pp. 168-192). New York: 
Guildford Publications. 
 
Anderson, C.A. & Huesmann, L.R. (2003). Human aggression: A social-cognitive view. In 
M.A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Ed.), The sage handbook of social psychology. CA: Sage 
Publications Inc. 
 
Anderson, J.R., Reder, L.M., & Lebiere, C. (1996). Working memory: Activation limits on 
retrieval. Cognitive Psychology, 30, 221-256. 
 
Baddeley, A.D. & Hitch, G.J. (1974). Working memory. In G. Bower (Ed.), The psychology 
of learning and motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 47-90). San Diego: Academic Press. 
 
Balota, D.A., Cortese, M.J., Hutchison, K.A., Neely, J.H., Nelson, D., Simpson, G.B., 
Treiman, R. (2002). The English Lexicon Project: A web-based repository of 
descriptive and behavioral measures for 40,481 English words and nonwords. 
Retrieved July 9, 2007 from http://elexicon.wustl.edu/, Washington University. 
 
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory of mass communication. Media Psychology, 2, 
265-199. 
 
Bargh, J.A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effect 
of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and 





Bartholow, B.D., Anderson, C.A., Carnagey, N.L., & Benjamin Jr., A.J. (2004). Interactive 
effects of life experiences and situational cues on aggression: The weapons priming 
effect in hunters and nonhunters. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 48-
60. 
 
Becker, S., Moscovitch, M., Behrmann, M., & Joordens, S. (1997). Long-term semantic 
priming: A computational account and empirical evidence. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Leaning, Memory, and Cognition, 23, 1059-1082. 
 
Berkowitz, L. (1984). Some effects of thoughts and anti- and prosocial influences of media 
events: A cognitive-neoassociation analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 410-427. 
 
Berkowitz, L. (1986). Situation influence on reactions to observed violence. Journal of 
Social Issues, 24, 93-106. 
 
Berkowitz, L. & LePage, A. (1967). Weapons as aggression-eliciting stimuli. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 202-207. 
 
Betsch, T. & Dickenberger, D. (1993). Why do aggressive movies make people more 
aggressive? An attempt to explain short term effects of the depiction of violence on 
the observer. Aggressive Behavior, 19, 137-149. 
 
Blumler, J.G. (1979). The role of theory in uses and gratifications studies. Communication 
Research, 6, 9-36. 
 
Blumler, J.G. & Katz, E. (1974). The uses of mass communication. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Bushman, B.J. (1995). Moderating role of trait aggressiveness in the effects of violent media 
on aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 950-960. 
 
Bushman, B.J. & Geen, R.G. (1990). Role of cognitive-emotional mediators and individual 
differences in the effects of media violence on aggression. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 58, 156-163. 
 
Bushman, B.J. & Huesmann, R.J. (2006). Short-term and long-term effects of violent media 
on aggression in children and adults. Archives of Pediatric Adolescent Medicine, 10, 
348-352. 
 
Buss, A.H. & Perry, M. (1992). The aggression questionnaire. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 63, 452-459. 
 
Cacioppo, J.T. & Petty, R.E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 




Collins, A.M. & Loftus, E.F. (1975). A spreading activation theory of semantic processing. 
Psychological Review, 82, 407-428. 
 
Dark, V.J., Johnston, W.A., Myles-Worsley, M., & Farah, M.J. (1985). Levels of selection 
and capacity limits. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 472-497. 
 
Dunand, M., Berkowitz, L. & Leyens, J. (1984). Audience effects when viewing aggressive 
movies. British Journal of Social Psychology, 23, 69-76. 
 
Feldman, E.S., Bombyk, D. (Producer)& Weir, P. (Director) (1985). Witness [Motion 
Picture]. United States: Paramount Pictures. 
 
Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
 
Friedrich, F.J., Henik, A., & Tzelgov, J. (1991). Automatic processes in lexical access and 
spreading activation.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance, 17, 792-806. 
 
Gentile, D. A. & Anderson, C. A. (2006).  Violent video games: Effects on youth and public 
policy implications.  In N. E. Dowd, D. G. Singer, & R. F. Wilson (Eds.), Handbook 
of children, culture, and violence (pp. 225-246).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Henik, A. Friedrich, F.J., & Kellog, W.A. (1983). The dependence of semantic relatedness 
effects upon priming processing. Memory & Cognition, 11, 366-373. 
 
Henik, A. Freidrick, F.J., Tzelgov, J., & Tramer, S. (1994). Capacity demands of automatic 
processes in semantic priming. Memory & Cognition, 22, 157-168. 
 
Johnson, J.G., Cohen, P., Smailes, E.M., Kasen, S., & Brook, J.S. (2002). Television viewing 
and aggressive behavior during adolescence and adulthood. Science, 295, 2468-2471. 
 
Jung, C.G. (1923). Psychological types. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
 
Katz, E., Blumler, J.G., & Gurevitch, M. (1973). Uses and gratifications research. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 37, 509-523. 
 
Keirsey, D. & Bates, M. (1984). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Gnosology Books. 
 
Kuiken, D., Phillips, L., Gregus, M., Miall, D.S., Verbitsky, M., & Tonkonogy, A., (2004). 
Locating self-modifying feelings within literary readings. Discourse Processes, 38, 
267-268. 
 
Lang, A. (2000). The limited capacity model of mediated message processing. Journal of 
Communication, 50, 46-70. 
  
81 
Leyens, J. Cisneros, T., & Hossay, J. (1976). Decentration as a means for reducing 
aggression after exposure to violent stimuli. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
6, 459-473. 
 
Leyens, J. & Dunand, M. (1991). Priming aggressive thoughts: The effect of the anticipation 
of a violent movie upon the aggressive behavior of the spectators. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 21, 507-516. 
 
Lindsey, J.L. & Anderson, C.A. (2000). From antecedent conditions to violent actions: A 
general affective aggression model. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 
533-547 
 
Mathews, V.P., Kronenberger, W.G., Wang, Y., Lurito, J.T., Lowe, M.J., & Dunn, D.W. 
(2005). Media violence exposure and frontal lobe activation measured by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging in aggressive and nonaggressive adolescents. Journal of 
Computer Assisted Tomography, 29, 287-292. 
 
Mehrabian, A. & Epstein, N. (1972). A measure of emotional empathy. Journal of 
Personality, 40, 525-543. 
 
Miall, D.S. (1989). Beyond the schema given: Affective comprehension of literary narratives. 
Cognition and Emotion, 3, 55-78. 
 
Miller, G.A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our 
capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97. 
 
Neely, J.H. (1991). Semantic priming effects in visual word recognition: A selective review 
of currents findings and theories. In D. Besner & G. Humphreys (Eds.), Basic 
processes in reading: Visual word recognition (pp. 264-336). Hillsdale, Hove, 
London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Oberauer, K. (2002). Access to information in working memory: Exploring the focus of 
attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 28, 
411-421. 
 
Otsuka, S. & Kawaguchi, J. (2007). Divided attention modulates semantic activation: 
Evidence from a nonletter-level prime task. Memory & Cognition, 35, 2001-2011. 
 
Remington, R.W., & Folk, C.L. (2001). A dissociation between attention and selection. 
Psychological Science, 12, 511-515. 
 
Sebastion, R.J., Parke, R.D., Berkowitz, L., & West, S.G. (1978). Film violence and verbal 





Seldon, R. (1989). A reader’s guide to contemporary literary theory. Kentucky: University 
Press. 
 
Smith, M.C., Bentin, S., & Spalek, T.M. (2001). Attention constraints of semantic activation 
during visual word recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 27, 1289-1298. 
 
Wells, G.L., & Windschitl, P.D. (1999). Stimulus sampling and social psychological 
experimentation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1115-1125. 
 
Woltz, D.J. & Was, C.A. (2006). Availability of related long-term memory during and after 




 I would like to thank Dr. Douglas Gentile, my major professor, for his patience and 
willingness to support my interests, as well as all the feedback he was able to provide for me 
along the way.  I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Susan Cross and Dr. 
Lulu Rodriguez, for their input.  I would also like to thank the following people for their 
contributions: Dr. Veronica Dark for allowing me to come to her with questions and 
providing me with direction for the semantic priming considerations of this paper, Dr. 
Nathaniel Wade for his willingness to answer my questions and provide support for me on 
this venture, and Kari Terzino for providing me with a lexical decision task program.  
Finally, I would like to thank Sheila Betts and Anne Maier for their hard work helping me 
develop a coding scheme and serving as raters for the striking-scene responses. 
